The Impact on U.S. Industries of Carbon Prices with Output-Based Rebates over Multiple Time Frames by Adkins, Liwayway et al.
1616 P St. NW 
Washington, DC 20036 
202-328-5000   www.rff.org     
 
December 2010      RFF DP 10-47 
 
 
The Impact on U.S. 
Industries of Carbon 
Prices with Output-
Based Rebates over 
Multiple Time Frames 
 
 
Liwayway Adkins, Richard Garbaccio, Mun Ho,  


















© 2011 Resources for the Future. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper may be reproduced without 
permission of the authors. 
Discussion papers are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and discussion. 
They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review. 
The Impact on U.S. Industries of Carbon Prices with Output-Based 
Rebates over Multiple Time Frames 
Liwayway Adkins, Richard Garbaccio, Mun Ho, Eric Moore, and Richard Morgenstern  
Abstract 
The effects of a carbon price on U.S. industries are likely to change over time as firms and 
customers gradually adjust to new prices. The effects will also depend on the number of countries 
implementing the policy as well as offsetting policies to compensate losers. We examine the effects of a 
$15/ton CO2 price, including Waxman-Markey-type allocations to vulnerable industries, over four time 
horizons—the very short-, short-, medium-, and long-runs—distinguished by the ability of firms to raise 
output prices, change their input mix, and reallocate capital. We find that if firms cannot pass on higher 
costs, the loss in profits in a number of industries will indeed be large. When output prices can rise to 
reflect higher energy costs, the reduction in output and profits is substantially smaller. Over the medium- 
and long-terms, however, when more adjustments occur, the impact on output is more varied due to 
general equilibrium effects. The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can substantially offset the output losses 
over all four time frames considered. We also consider competitiveness and leakage effects—changes in 
trade flows and changes in emissions in the rest of the world. We examine two measures of leakage: 
―trade-related‖ leakage that accounts for both the increased volume of net imports into the U.S. as well as 
the higher carbon intensity of these imports, and a broader leakage measure that includes the effect of 
increased fossil fuel consumption in countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing policy. 
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carbon leakage  
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The Impact on U.S. Industries of Carbon Prices with Output-Based 
Rebates over Multiple Time Frames 
Liwayway Adkins, Richard Garbaccio, Mun Ho, Eric Moore, and Richard Morgenstern 
I. Introduction 
Pricing carbon emissions through an economy-wide cap-and-trade system or a tax not 
only will adversely affect electricity and primary energy producers, but also will hurt the 
competitive position of industries that consume large amounts of energy. Energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed (EITE) sectors, such as metals and chemicals, could be especially impacted 
under such a policy. This situation gives rise to two overarching concerns. First, some domestic 
industries will be disproportionately burdened if carbon-pricing policies affect their operations 
but not those of their international competitors. Second, some of the environmental benefits 
will be eroded if increases in U.S. manufacturing costs from uneven international carbon 
pricing cause economic activity and the corresponding emissions to ―leak‖ to nations with 
weaker or no carbon-pricing policies. 
Industry-level impacts are fundamentally tied to the carbon intensity of producers, the 
degree to which they can pass costs to consumers, and their ability to substitute away from 
carbon-intensive energy. The strength of competition from imports and consumers’ ability to 
substitute other, less carbon-intensive alternatives for a given product also play crucial roles in 
determining the ultimate impacts on domestic production and employment.  
While the most effective approach to reduce the disproportionate impacts of domestic 
carbon pricing is to ensure comparable action by other countries, recent experience on the 
international stage underscores the difficulty of reaching a broad-based international agreement 
in the near term. Absent such an agreement, the U.S. Congress has considered various 
legislative proposals to reduce the trade impacts of domestic carbon pricing, including the free 
allocation of emissions allowances to the most affected sectors. If these free allowances, or 
rebates, are updated on the basis of recent output levels as proscribed, for example, in the 
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American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), firms would be encouraged to 
maintain production levels in the face of policy-induced cost increases while sustaining 
incentives created by the emissions cap to reduce the carbon intensity of production. 
Importantly, the per-unit allowance allocation would not be based on the firm’s emissions but 
on a sector-based intensity standard, thus creating incentives for within-sector market shares to 
shift toward firms with low emissions intensity.  
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models allow for the estimation of long-run 
industry-level and consumer welfare impacts of carbon-pricing policies after firms have 
adjusted by using new technologies and the market has established new import patterns. Many 
such analyses use a mobile-factor framework in which workers and producers are assumed to 
shift seamlessly from the taxed to the untaxed sectors. Such long-run analyses, however, fail to 
capture the short-run impacts of carbon-pricing policies. A steel mill faced with higher energy 
costs cannot immediately and without cost convert to more energy-efficient methods. If it 
leaves its output price unchanged, the higher input costs will lower profits. If it tries to raise 
prices to cover the higher costs, it will face lower sales. Stakeholders will likely oppose a 
carbon policy that does not fairly address these impacts.  
Since the conditions facing firms and the available mitigation options will change over 
time, appropriate policies also must consider the temporal dimension of the impacts. Analyses 
using dynamic general equilibrium models do take some time-relevant adjustments into 
account. However, such models are highly aggregated and generally ignore potentially 
important differences among major energy-consuming sectors, such as cement, aluminum, 
chemicals, and others.  
This paper advances the study of competitiveness issues by examining the impacts of 
both unilateral U.S. and uniform Annex I carbon-pricing policies. The analysis examines a 
highly disaggregated set of industries, accounting for time-relevant changes in the ability to 
fully adjust to policy realities and the free, output-based allowance allocations adopted in H.R. 
2454 for EITE industries. The modeling also incorporates the special treatment of the refining 
sector as well as electricity and gas local distribution companies (LDCs) contained in this 
legislation. Other net revenues raised by the cap and trade system are returned to households, 
partially offsetting the higher prices. The analysis is based on an economy-wide carbon dioxide 
(CO2) price of $15/ton, which is broadly consistent with projections of allowance prices under 
H.R. 2454 in the first half of the next decade (EIA 2009a; EPA 2009a). Building on the 
framework adopted in Ho et al. (2008), four time horizons are considered:  
  the very short-run, where output prices cannot be changed but input prices rise and 
profits fall accordingly; 3 
  the short-run, where output prices can rise to reflect the higher energy costs, with 
corresponding decline in sales as a result of product and/or import substitution; 
  the medium-run, when in addition to the changes in output prices, the mix of inputs may 
change, but capital remains in place, and general equilibrium (i.e., economy-wide) 
effects are considered; and 
  the long-run, or full general equilibrium analysis, when capital may be reallocated and 
replaced with more energy-efficient technologies. 
We analyze both the first and second time horizons in a partial equilibrium framework 
with fixed input coefficients. The first horizon, without changes in output prices, involves no 
demand adjustments at all. While this may seem unrealistic, it produces the maximum possible 
impact on profits. The second horizon requires an estimate of the demand elasticity for each 
industry’s output—i.e., the percentage change in sales resulting from a 1 percent increase in the 
industry’s output price. We estimate these elasticities using a global general equilibrium model, 
which allows us to capture the effect of customers switching to other products, including 
substitution to similar imported commodities.  
We analyze the third time horizon with a long-run CGE model based on the GTAP 7 
database.1 Such a model recognizes that the demand for steel, for example, depends not only on 
its price, but also on the price of plastics and other intermediate goods—indeed the price of 
everything in the economy. Higher energy prices raise the prices of steel and plastic while 
directly lowering the demand for both. In addition, a lower demand for plastic indirectly lowers 
the chemical industry’s demand for steel. These general equilibrium effects are not considered 
in the first two time horizons. At the same time, the third, medium-run case continues to 
assume that capital is not mobile—i.e., it cannot move away from the now less profitable 
industries. Therefore, when sales fall because of higher costs being passed on as higher prices, 
profits will also fall, leading to a lower rate of return to capital.  
The fourth time horizon, the full long-run analysis, allows for full capital mobility. 
Instead of industry-specific profit effects, the model shows the change in the economy-wide 
return to labor versus capital. The focus is on the long-run effects of carbon-pricing policies on 
consumption patterns—i.e., households and other components of final demand switching to less 
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energy-intensive products. This switch in final demand changes the structure of production and 
total energy consumption, but the long-run framework implies that returns to capital are 
equalized across industries. While the ―long-run‖ may be defined in a variety of ways, our 
definition simply uses a one-period model in which the supply of capital is given exogenously. 
A model with intertemporal features that determines savings endogenously will identify an 
effect not considered here: how the total stock of capital responds to the changes in prices due 
to a carbon tax.  
This framework allows us to capture the complex, often opposing adjustments occurring 
over time. On the one hand, producers of energy-intensive goods gradually can substitute 
toward cheaper, less carbon-intensive inputs, thereby lowering prices and increasing sales (see 
the supply curve shifting down, Fig A1 in  Appendix A.1.1). On the other hand, the customers 
of such energy-intensive goods also are gradually substituting toward alternative inputs and 
capital (see the demand curve shifting down) and reducing the demands. The net effect of these 
long-run adjustments is not clear a priori. Indeed, our results show that both influences are at 
work. 
H.R. 2454 provides allowance rebates to covered entities within an eligible sector for 
direct emissions from fossil fuel combustion as well as process-related sources. It also provides 
rebates for indirect emissions associated with the purchase of electricity. Eligible for rebate are 
six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries that have at least 5 
percent energy or greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity and 15 percent trade intensity.2 Additionally, 
other sectors that have an energy, or GHG, intensity larger than 20 percent are also deemed 
presumptively eligible. The list of 43 presumptively eligible industries, as determined by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is incorporated into our calculations.3 Refineries 
are not eligible for production rebates, although they are freely granted 2 percent of total 
allowances without regard to current output levels—i.e., via grandfathering.4  
Provisions in H.R. 2454 would allocate about 30 percent of the allowances gratis to 
electricity LDCs and about 9 percent to natural gas LDCs. The legislation mandates that these 
allowances be used for the ratepayers’ benefit, which is widely interpreted to include industrial 
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3 Taking into account the potential to carry forward unused allowances from one year to the next, as authorized in 
H.R. 2454, the number of allowances available is estimated to exceed the 2006 emissions of the eligible industries 
through 2025 (EPA 2009b, 36).  
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customers. Because indirect emissions from electricity consumption are an important 
component of total emissions of the eligible sectors, the LDC provisions are expected to 
mitigate a significant portion of the policy-induced costs to the eligible sectors. The allocations 
to natural gas LDCs are likely to have a smaller impact.5  
Assumptions about climate policies adopted in other countries are clearly important in 
understanding competitiveness and leakage issues. To cover a range of possibilities, we 
consider both a unilateral U.S. effort and a multilateral case with comparable actions by key 
U.S. trading partners. The U.S. unilateral case is not representative of real-world conditions 
because some major U.S. trading partners already have adopted carbon-pricing policies. 
However, it is useful for comparative purposes. For the multilateral case, it is plausible to 
assume comparable actions when estimating competiveness impacts because roughly half of 
U.S. trade in energy-intensive goods involves the European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, 
and New Zealand—nations that are reasonably expected to adopt carbon-pricing policies 
comparable to or even more stringent than those in the United States (EPA 2009b, 25). We 
present a limited set of results concerning emissions leakage; a more detailed description of the 
trade and leakage effects is given in Adkins et al. (forthcoming).  
The focus in this paper is on a sequence of relatively transparent steps designed to 
estimate the impacts of carbon pricing with and without rebate policies over the different time 
horizons. Impacts are measured in terms of reduced output, profits, and trade effects. Following 
this introduction, Section II reviews a number of previous studies that have examined 
competitiveness issues at a detailed, industry-specific level. We particularly focus on the 
analyses that have incorporated output-based rebates mechanisms of the type contained in H.R. 
2454. Section III describes the basic modeling approaches and data sources. For the more 
technically oriented reader, Appendices A and B provide further information on the models and 
data used, including the specific representation of H.R. 2454. Section IV presents an overview 
of cross-industry patterns of output, energy use, carbon intensity, and imports, as well as the 
industry-specific rebates contained in H.R. 2454. Section V describes the principal results for 
output and profits across multiple time horizons. Section VI addresses trade impacts. Section 
VII offers some overall conclusions.  
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II. Other Studies on Detailed Industry Impacts 
The literature on industry impacts of carbon policies is based largely on simulation 
modeling, although a number of papers, including a recent one by Aldy and Pizer (2009), rely 
on statistical analysis. The simulation analyses include both short-term partial equilibrium 
assessments as well as long-term CGE modeling. Ho et al. (2008) review more than a dozen 
prior U.S. and European analyses and report a series of estimates based on an earlier version of 
the current modeling framework. With the exception of a single paper by Fischer and Fox 
(2007), however, none of the earlier literature estimates the combined effects of carbon pricing 
and output-based rebating. Starting in 2009, with the passage of H.R. 2454, a number of such 
analyses have been performed, albeit on a quite aggregated basis.  
Fischer and Fox (2007) examine how the outcome of carbon policies is affected by 
alternative permit allocation mechanisms: auction, grandfathering, output-based allocation tied 
to emissions, and output-based allocation tied to value added. Using a model based on GTAP 6 
data (2001 base year), they report impacts on 18 non-energy sectors and 5 energy sectors. In a 
policy scenario that reduces emissions by about 14 percent below baseline, they estimate a 
reduction in overall output on the order of 0.34 percent for the output-based allocations tied to 
emissions, rising to as much as 0.51 percent for the other mechanisms. Overall, output declines 
consistently for the alternative allocation mechanisms across all industries examined, except 
food products and services. The hardest-hit manufacturing industries are chemicals and iron 
and steel, at about 1 percent each. All other manufacturing industries report output declines that 
are generally 0.5 percent or less. Fischer and Fox (2007) report emissions leakage of 12–15 
percent of total U.S. emissions reductions. The implied leakage rate for the energy-intensive 
industries is on the order of 40–45 percent.6  
An assessment by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, using its NEMS model, 
finds that the rebate mechanisms contained in H.R. 2454 result in smaller-percentage output 
reductions for the EITEs than for the manufacturing sector as a whole (EIA 2009a). An analysis 
of H.R. 2454 by the EPA, using the ADAGE model, estimates that without the output-based 
rebate provisions, production in the energy-intensive manufacturing industries decreases by 0.3 
percent in 2015 and by 0.7 percent in 2020 (EPA 2009a). With the output-based rebates, the 
EPA estimated that energy-intensive manufacturing output would increase by 0.04 percent in 
2015 and fall by only 0.3 percent in 2020. Unfortunately, neither the EIA nor the EPA models 
disaggregate industry impacts to any significant extent.  
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An interagency report on the competitiveness impacts of H.R. 2454 (EPA 2009b) relies 
on an updated version of the Fischer–Fox GTAP-based model described above. Specifically, 
output-based rebates were modeled for 5 aggregated sectors, incorporating 37 of the 43 six-
digit NAICS EITE industries deemed to be presumptively eligible for rebates. This procedure 
involves some approximations because not all six-digit industries within a modeled two-digit 
sector are presumptively eligible, but it represents a quite reasonable approach. Using 
somewhat more disaggregated industry classifications, we adopt a largely similar approach for 
modeling rebates in the present study.  
The results of the interagency report—including those for output-based allocations at a 
rate equal to the average emissions intensity of an industry’s production—are roughly 
consistent with the more aggregate findings from NEMS and ADAGE. For three of the five 
sectors analyzed in the interagency report, the combined effect of the direct allocations to 
EITEs, plus those to LDCs, offsets virtually all of the incremental costs associated with the 
carbon pricing. For two sectors—chemicals and plastics; pulp, paper, and print—the allocations 
actually yield a small net gain. In other words, they reduce production costs compared to the 
case without any carbon pricing. One issue of interest is the relative importance of the direct 
allocations to EITEs versus the LDC rebates. For the five relatively aggregated industry groups 
examined in the interagency report, the LDC rebates constitute a relatively small share of the 
total cost reductions compared to the consistently larger effect of the direct industry rebates. 
The interagency report also considers the impacts of the rebate programs on trade flows 
giving rise to emissions leakage. Here, it is useful to recall the two main sources of emissions 
leakage: changes in trade flows and global substitutions in production processes associated with 
changing fuel and raw material prices induced by the domestic carbon policy. Fischer and Fox 
(2007, 2009) find the latter to be larger than the former. However, because trade flows are more 
readily influenced by policy measures than substitutions, and because they are an important 
proxy for domestic output and employment losses in the manufacturing-intensive states, the 
interagency report focuses solely on trade flows as the metric of impacts.7  
Although the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) does not use an output-based 
rebate system, several recent studies have examined the possible impacts of such a mechanism 
on specific industries in the European Union. Demailly and Quirion (2006) find that if the EU 
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also noteworthy that while output-based rebates can stem the loss of net imports and, implicitly, the associated 
output and employment losses in the EITE industries, they are not an effective tool for addressing emissions 
leakage and other domestic impacts associated with changes in global fuel and materials prices.  8 
cement producers received output-based allocations at a rate equal to 90 percent of the 
industry’s historical emissions intensity, imports to the European Union would be 
insignificantly impacted under an EU cap-and-trade program, even if allowance prices reached 
as high as 50 Euros per ton of CO2. Similarly, an analysis by the Carbon Trust (2008) found 
that output-based allocations in steel and other energy-intensive sectors could significantly 
reduce increases in imports that could otherwise result from the EU ETS. 
III. Implementation: Data and Model Construction  
The very-short-run and short-run cases examined in this paper rely on a fixed 
coefficient, input–output (I-O) model of the U.S. economy, disaggregated to the 52-sector level 
based on the NAICS. To represent the very short-run, where output prices cannot be changed 
but input prices rise and profits fall, the effect of a carbon tax is computed using a modification 
of the Leontief inverse.8 Two cases are considered, one without the allowance rebates and one 
with them. The I-O data, which provide the dollar value for industry output and intermediate 
inputs used by a detailed set of U.S. industries, are based on the 2006 I-O tables supplemented 
by details from the 2002 benchmark I-O tables (see Appendix B). We use 2006 data because it 
is the most recent year of the EIA’s Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey, which gives 
the energy consumption data for a detailed set of manufacturing industries, including fossil fuel 
and electricity use, distinguished by combustion and non-fuel use (EIA 2006b).  
For some non-manufacturing sectors, we rely on energy-use data from the Annual 
Energy Review (EIA 2006a). For consistency, we reconcile these energy data with the national 
totals and with the I-O value estimates to compute the carbon emissions from combustion and 
electricity use in each industry. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2008 (EIA 
2009b) provides a detailed picture of the emissions from direct fuel consumption and process 
emissions. The three main sources of process emissions are cement production, limestone 
consumption, and natural gas production, together accounting for 87 percent of the total 104 
million tons of CO2 from process emissions in 2008.9 While a small portion of total U.S. 
emissions, they represent a significant proportion of the total emissions of these three 
industries.  
                                                 
8 Our methodology is described in detail in Appendix A. The carbon embodied in a unit of output is given in 
equation A17. This modifies the standard Leontief formula to take into account the fact that some energy inputs 
are feedstock and therefore not combusted. The effect of the carbon price on commodity prices is then given by 
equation A19. These changes in prices raise the cost of production; equation A34 gives the effect of the higher 
costs, less any subsidies, on the output price.  
9 See Appendix B for complete data description. The process emissions are given in Table 15 of EIA 2009b.  9 
For the short-run analysis, where output prices can rise to reflect higher energy costs, 
with corresponding declines in sales as a result of product and/or import substitution, the I-O 
model is supplemented with an elasticity of demand for industry output. In the absence of 
comprehensive, consistent estimates of such elasticities for all industries, we calculate the 
elasticities using the CGE model, described below.  
To estimate the demand elasticity for industry j, we simulate a small tax on the output 
of j and record the effect on its sales. For energy-producing industries, such as coal and oil, we 
apply the same tax to imports because the goal is to price the consumption of fossil fuels. 
Estimating the demand curve for coal is a more delicate exercise. A price of $15 per ton of CO2 
would almost double the price of coal at the mine mouth. As a result, we need to estimate the 
demand curve over a large range of prices and should not expect a linear assumption to be valid 
for the whole range. In this case, we simulate the demand elasticity by applying a 75 percent 
tax on coal. Since the CGE model is more aggregated than our I-O model, the elasticity 
estimated, for example, for chemicals, is applied to all six sub-industries in the chemicals 
group. This simulation procedure is applied to all industries except petroleum refining, for 
which we impose a short-run demand elasticity that is smaller than that generated with the CGE 
model, based on the work of Hughes et al. (2006).  
The proposed bills have provisions to return the revenue from the sales of permits back 
to households, that is, the revenue left over after giving the rebates to the EITE industries. 
Economists debate how households dispose of such transfers. Are they regarded as temporary 
and thus mostly saved, or are they regarded as permanent allowing a higher level of 
consumption permanently? If the latter, do they change the spending habits within our ―short-
run‖ horizon? Since the carbon price plan is a long-run plan with carbon prices and transfers 
that last many years into the future, we take the simplest approach and assume that all of the 
transfers will be spent in the short-run. For the short-run horizon we use a simple ―partial 
equilibrium‖ approach, and as explained above, estimate the change in sales of each 
commodity using the elasticities estimated. We do not aim for general equilibrium 
completeness here. In that spirit, we estimate the household consumption change due to the 
transfers as a simple scaling of current expenditures, in proportion to the total transfers.10 
In the I-O framework, the value of output for each industry is equal to the sum of the 
intermediate inputs, compensation of employees, indirect business taxes, and other value 
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added, which is often referred to as capital compensation.11 We use the term ―profits‖ to refer 
to this other value added; it includes the conventional pre-tax profits and the value of 
depreciation.  
To analyze the medium- and long-run, we use a multi-country CGE model with global 
coverage that allows us to simulate both the input substitution and trade effects. For the long-
run scenario, we simulate a carbon tax and use the model to estimate the effects on the outputs 
and inputs of each industry, allowing for a full set of substitutions within each region. For the 
medium term, capital is assumed to be fixed and cannot be re-allocated among industries. In all 
cases, factors are assumed to not move across borders. 
The CGE model is based on the GTAP 7 database (2004 base year) and is an updated 
version of Adkins and Garbaccio (2007) and identifies 8 regions and 29 sectors. The regions 
are the United States, Canada, Mexico, China, India, the rest of Annex I, oil-exporting 
countries, and the rest of the world. The 29 sectors include 15 manufacturing sectors and 6 
energy sectors: coal, oil mining, gas mining, gas distribution, petroleum and coal products, and 
electricity. The production functions are constant elasticity of substitution, where capital and 
labor form a ―value-added‖ aggregate input, and there is substitution between value-added 
inputs and an energy bundle. Imports are imperfect substitutes for domestic varieties. The labor 
supply is elastic for all but the lowest income regions (China, India, and rest of the world). 
Among the simulation outputs, the model can calculate the effects of the CO2 tax on industry-
specific exports and imports, where the tax is defined as a levy on both domestic fuel producers 
and importers. 
For all four horizons, we consider two policies, a carbon tax only and a carbon tax plus 
output-based rebates. The subsidies are described in Section IV below. In the model 
simulations, these subsidies are put on the industry output prices so that producers receive more 
than what consumers pay. Although the legislation provides for a gradual phase-out of these 
subsidies, in our simulation, we consider only the impact of the initial, maximum level of 
subsidies. As a result, our ―long-run‖ scenario should not be interpreted as the simulated effect 
of the legislation in year 2030 but as an indication of the effects of capital adjustment to the 
subsidies.  
The issue of how the new revenue from a carbon tax, or sales of permits, is used is an 
important one that is addressed in the literature on tax distortion and tax interaction effects. 
                                                 
11 This ―other value added,‖ described in detail in Appendix B, includes the value added of proprietorships, which 
compensates for both capital and labor of the proprietors.  11 
Revenues that are recycled back through reductions in other tax rates will reduce the tax 
distortions there, revenues that are recycled as lump-sum transfers will not. Revenues that are 
used for new government spending may provide new public goods. For our analysis of the 
longer horizons we use the option that is clearest to analyze—a reduction in tax rates on labor 
income. We believe this is also the more realistic option. That is, in our simulations, any new 
revenue that is not rebated back as output subsidies will be used to reduce the labor tax, 
keeping government expenditures and deficits the same as the base case. For the short-run (no 
substitution) horizon, these revenues are simply used to dampen the fall in real consumption 
expenditures. 12 
IV. Industry Patterns and Rebates under H.R. 2454 
Energy Consumption Patterns and Carbon Intensity 
We begin this section by describing the energy consumption patterns and carbon 
content of the 52 industries considered in the short-run analyses. Tables 1–3 present a summary 
of these industries’ energy consumption, expressed as energy costs as a share of total costs for 
electricity, fossil fuel (combusted portion only), and total energy, including non-combustion 
use of fossil fuels. Total costs are defined as the value of all inputs for industry j, including 
capital input, and the total is equal to the value of industry output (at the seller’s price before 
taxes on production).  
As shown in column 3 of Table 1, the contribution of energy costs, including 
feedstocks, to total costs varies widely across the different manufacturing industries, ranging 
from 69 percent in the petroleum industry to less than 1 percent in miscellaneous 
manufacturing, computer and electrical equipment, and apparel. For the non-manufacturing 
sectors, a similarly wide range exists, from a high of almost 49 percent in gas utilities to about 
0.4 percent in finance and insurance. Of the 33 manufacturing industries, 22 have energy costs 
exceeding 6 percent of total costs. Of the 19 non-manufacturing industries, 8 have energy costs 
exceeding 6 percent of total costs. Even when energy costs are restricted to the combusted 
portion, as shown in column 2 of Table 1, the cost shares are as high as 23.6 percent in the 
fertilizers industry. 
Within the manufacturing sector, the use of specific fuels also varies greatly. As can be 
computed from columns 2 and 3 in Table 1, more than 60 percent of total energy costs are 
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on industry results.  12 
associated with direct fuel combustion in a number of industries: pulp mills, petrochemical 
manufacturing, other basic organic chemical manufacturing, glass, lime and gypsum, and other 
nonmetallic minerals. Electricity accounts for more than 60 percent of total energy costs for 
other industries, including textiles, apparel, inorganic chemical manufacturing, alumina 
refining and primary aluminum production, ferrous metals, machinery, computer and electrical 
equipment, motor vehicles, other transportation equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing.  
Outside of manufacturing, the gas utilities sector has the highest energy cost share at 
48.9 percent. This is followed by air transportation at 21.3 percent, most of which is direct fuel 
combustion. Electricity generation (private and government utilities) is at 17.7 percent, 
followed by other mining activities at 7.4 percent.  
Table 2 displays the value of industry output for the 52 industries along with the energy 
consumption information, expressed as a physical quantity for the 6 fuels included in the model 
(with the largest manufacturing consumers listed here in parentheses): tons of coal (iron and 
steel), barrels of crude oil (refining), liquid petroleum gas, or LPG (refining), other petroleum 
(petrochemical manufacturing), cubic feet of natural gas (refining), and kilowatt-hours of 
electricity (other chemicals and plastics). Not surprisingly, coal and natural gas use by electric 
utilities is far greater than that of even the largest manufacturing consumers. Similarly, use of 
non-LPG petroleum as well as electricity by the air transport, real estate, and rental industries 
far exceeds that of the largest manufacturing consumers of those fuels.  
Table 3 presents the CO2 emissions (expressed in thousand  metric tons) for direct 
combustion, electricity consumption, and process emissions, as well as total CO2 content per 
million dollars of output—i.e., total CO2 intensity. Note that more than half the total emissions 
are process-related from cement and from lime and gypsum, the two most CO2-intensive 
manufacturing industries. Fertilizer, the third most CO2-intensive industry, is dominated by 
direct combustion (mostly of natural gas), while in alumina refining and primary aluminum, the 
fourth most CO2-intensive industry, about 80 percent of emissions are derived from electricity 
consumption.13  
Import Exposure 
While the vulnerability of domestic producers to import competition is not necessarily 
related to the level of import penetration, a high import share does indicate a potential for such 
                                                 
13 A detailed description of the data and calculations is given in Appendix B. The CO2 content of the electricity 
consumed by industry is derived from state-specific data on electricity production and industry output. Thus, the 
aluminum produced in states with more zero-emission hydropower is reflected in this calculation.  13 
competition. The last column of Table 1 displays the import share of total U.S. consumption by 
value. The contribution of imports to total supply of manufactures in the U.S. market also 
varies greatly by industry, ranging from 87 percent for apparel and 64 percent for computer and 
electrical equipment to zero for nonferrous metal foundries. In the results presented below, the 
vulnerability to imports or international leakage associated with an increase in the domestic 
CO2 price depends on the import substitution elasticity (as embodied in the CGE model) and 
the import share.  
Output-Based Rebates under H.R. 2454 
As discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.2, H.R. 2454 provides for rebates to 
energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries based on their historical CO2 emissions. Table 4a 
displays our estimates of the value of these allocations to EITE industries, and the implied 
subsidy rates, based on our 52-industry disaggregation. While the refining industry is not 
technically eligible for the output-based rebates, the value of the grandfathered rebates granted 
to them also is displayed in Table 4a.14 Of the 33 manufacturing industries, 21 are eligible for 
at least some rebates, while the remaining 12 industries receive no rebates at all. Firms within 
the eligible industries will be allocated quotas based on their output. The top rebate recipients 
are refiners ($2.02 billion), iron and steel mills ($943 million), and other basic organic 
chemical manufacturing ($779 million). We compute the subsidy rate as the ratio of the 
industry rebate value to the industry output value.15 These subsidy rates vary widely among the 
various sectors, ranging from a low of 0.002 percent for food manufacturing to a high of 4.47 
percent for cement. The LDC allocations for electric and gas utilities are also translated into 
output subsidy rates. 
The last column of Table 4a, the qualifying industry share, reflects the portion of 
industry output presumptively eligible for rebates under H.R. 2454. Thus, paper mills, pulp 
mills, and 12 other industries, all identified at the six-digit NAICS level, qualify for rebates on 
100 percent of their output. Since fertilizer, chemicals and plastics, and six other industries are 
not entirely comprised of presumptively eligible six-digit NAICS industries, their qualifying 
share is less than 100 percent.  
Comparable calculations for the industry definitions used in our 29-sector medium- and 
long-run analyses are displayed in Table 4b, which also includes a concordance between the 
                                                 
14 H.R. 2454 grants 2.25 percent of the total allowances to the refining sector; with our industry disaggregation 
this is allocated to ―Refining-LPG‖ ($114.1 million) and ―Refining-Other‖ ($1,905.8 million).  
15 See equation A49 in Appendix A.  14 
29- and 52-sector aggregations. Of the 15 manufacturing industries represented in the CGE 
model, nine are eligible for subsidies (including the allocation to refining). We see that the 
subsidy rate for the now more aggregated chemicals, rubber, and plastics sector is only 0.25 
percent, while Table 4a indicates that the component sub-sectors range from 1.23 percent for 
petrochemicals to 0.02 percent for other chemicals and plastics. Cement, which had the highest 
subsidy rate at 4.47 percent in Table 4a, is subsumed within nonmetallic minerals in Table 4b, 
which receives a subsidy of 0.5 percent. 
V. Effects of a Carbon Tax over Different Time Horizons 
This section presents the results of our four different modeling frameworks. The most 
comprehensive results are available for industrial output, while industry-specific estimates for 
profits and trade effects are presented for only some modeling horizons. To illustrate the effects 
of an economy-wide carbon-pricing policy, we simulate the effects of a carbon tax of $15/ton 
CO2 (2006$) with and without accompanying output-based rebates for EITE as well as those 
for electricity and gas LDCs and petroleum refining.16  
Effects on Industry Prices: Very-Short-Run Horizon 
Table 5 displays the effects of a $15/ton CO2 tax on industry output prices with and 
without the output-based rebates, over the very-short-run time horizon.17 As noted, this 
scenario is a hypothetical, worst-case assessment because it assumes that producers cannot 
raise prices, adjust output, change their input mix, or adopt new technologies in response to 
higher costs. Nonetheless, recognizing that the carbon tax (net of the rebates) will raise the 
price of all intermediate inputs, we do include this increase in industry prices on the input side. 
At the same time, when calculating the effect on profits in the very short-run, output prices are 
assumed to remain unchanged. Thus, there is an inherent inconsistency in the very short run 
analysis:  firms pay more for their inputs but are unable to pass along the added costs to their 
customers. The results in Table 5 are thus valid taken one industry at a time, they cannot be 
regarded as applicable simultaneously. The value of the exercise is in the (subsequent) 
comparison with the short run results, where we highlight the importance of output price 
increases as a means of offsetting reductions in profits.  
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each of the 52 industries, as shown in Appendix A.  
17The change in industry prices is computed using equation A34. 15 
For most manufacturing industries, industry prices are estimated to increase by less than 
2 percent even without the rebates. For some industries, however, the price increases are larger: 
refining-lpg prices are estimated to rise the most (22.4 percent), followed by other refining (9.8 
percent) and cement (5.7 percent).18  
With the subsidies, the estimated price increases are smaller but not uniformly so. 
While the rebates only slightly reduce the price increases for refining because these goods bear 
a direct tax on carbon, they almost completely eliminate other price increases. Other large 
beneficiaries (in percentage terms) from the H.R. 2454 industry rebates include pulp mills, 
paper mills, glass containers, iron and steel mills, and alumina refining. The only two non-
manufacturing sectors substantially benefiting from the H.R. 2454 industry rebate provisions 
are the electric and gas utilities, where the rebates suppress approximately 80–90 percent of the 
price increases that would occur otherwise .  
Effects on Costs: Very-Short-Run Horizon 
Given the tax-induced changes in industrial prices noted above, we now describe the 
industry-specific effects on costs. The estimated percentage changes in total unit costs, without 
the subsidies, are displayed in the first column of Table 6, while the remaining columns give 
the contributions to this total from changes in fuel prices (direct combustion), electricity prices, 
and prices of non-energy inputs.  
The most heavily impacted sector is electricity generation, where costs rise by 9 
percent. Three of the 33 manufacturing sectors—cement, other basic organic chemical 
manufacturing, and lime and gypsum—are estimated to face cost increases exceeding 3 
percent. The following eight manufacturing sectors face cost increases between 2 and 3 
percent: paperboard mills, petrochemical manufacturing, plastics and material resins, artificial 
and synthetic fibers and filaments, fertilizers, glass containers, iron and steel mills, and alumina 
refining. We emphasize that these are the effects of a $15/ton CO2 tax. For a $60/ton tax, costs 
would be larger by a factor of four (in percentage terms).  
Table 7 presents a similar breakdown of cost impacts with the inclusion of the H.R. 
2454 rebates. Not surprisingly, the overall impacts of the policy are lessened. Only the cement 
sector has cost impacts greater than 3 percent. Three sectors—other basic organic chemicals, 
lime and gypsum, and petrochemicals—have cost impacts between 2 and 3 percent. For those 
                                                 
18 The price changes in Table 5 are changes in industry prices, as opposed to commodity prices. This distinction is 
described in Appendix A but is not significant for our purposes here. Commodity price effects are available on 
request.  16 
sectors having a 1–2 percent increase under a carbon-pricing policy without rebates, the 
introduction of rebates appears to have only a small effect on costs. Eleven manufacturing 
sectors experience cost impacts of 1–2 percent when rebates are present compared to twelve 
without the rebates. In the non-manufacturing sectors, we see no significant changes with the 
introduction of rebates. For electric and gas utilities, the cost impacts of more expensive coal 
and gas are essentially the same because the rebates subsidize the output of these utilities, not 
the inputs.  
Of particular interest is the pattern of differences in unit costs with and without the 
rebates. For example, glass containers, mineral wool, aluminum, and other primary metals 
experience net cost increases that are 50–70 percent smaller with the rebates. This is due to the 
large subsidy for electricity prices, which is an important input in metals production. In the case 
of aluminum, the change in electricity costs raises total costs by 1.58 percent in the no-subsidy 
case but only by 0.3 percent in the rebate case. 
Effects on Output and Profits: Short-Run versus the Very-Short-Run 
In contrast to the very-short-run, where there is an inherent inconsistency between the 
individual sector results and those for the full set of industries, in the short-run horizon the 
treatment of input and output prices is fully consistent, as we assume that producers raise prices 
to cover the higher unit costs, with resulting reductions in sales and output as customers switch 
to alternative goods or imports.19 As expected, the extent of import substitution depends 
critically on the assumptions made about the carbon-pricing policies of other countries. We 
consider two polar cases. The first assumes that the United States takes unilateral action and 
that none of our trading partners, including the European Union, adopt comparable policies. 
While this is an unlikely outcome, it is instructive because for a given time frame, it provides 
an upper bound on the impacts on U.S. industries. Much smaller losses in sales and output are 
seen in the second case, where it is assumed that all Annex I nations adopt a carbon-pricing 
scheme comparable to H.R. 2454. 
Table 8 displays the short-run changes in output with full revenue recycling both with 
and without the H.R. 2454 industry rebates. Table 8 also displays alternative assumptions of 
unilateral U.S. carbon pricing and Annex I-wide actions. In contrast to the very short-run, when 
industry output is assumed fixed, we observe substantial output reductions in the short-run, 
especially with unilateral action and no rebates. As shown in column 1, the sectors that incur 
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the biggest output losses in this case are other basic organic chemicals (4.6 percent), alumina 
refining (4.1 percent) and cement (4.1 percent). Experiencing losses between 3–4 percent are 
three other sectors: fertilizers, plastics and material resins and petrochemical manufacturing. 
The relatively large output declines in these sectors arise from the combined effects of large 
cost increases without the H.R. 2454 industry rebates and the relatively high demand 
elasticities of these industries under unilateral action. Some service industries gain as a result of 
the revenue recycled back to households.  
With the H.R. 2454 industry rebates, but still assuming unilateral U.S. action, output 
losses are generally lower. As shown in Table 8, column 3, the rebates are particularly 
beneficial to cement, alumina refining and primary aluminum, and glass containers. The output 
loss for cement is reduced close to zero. Glass containers and aluminum refining appear to gain 
slightly. Other sectors that see significantly smaller declines in output (in percentage terms) 
because of the rebates are iron and steel, paper mills, inorganic chemicals, mineral wool, and 
pulp mills. The service industries do not fare as well when the H.R. 2454 industry rebates are 
included, as the amount recycled back to households is halved, limiting the amount of 
expenditure switching from carbon intensive commodities to cleaner ones.  
With the assumption of a common Annex I carbon-pricing regime, the output losses are 
reduced further, in some cases dramatically so. For example, the cement industry losses are 
reduced from 4.6 to 1.8 percent without the H.R. 2454 industry rebates. With H.R. 2454 
industry rebates, sectors that see their output losses reduced to 0.1 percent or less include pulp 
mills, paper mills, cement, mineral wool, and iron and steel. In percentage terms, some of the 
biggest improvements occur in the chemicals and metals industries, reflecting the importance 
of competition from Annex I trade in these sectors. Glass containers and the aluminum refining 
industry see modest gains in output under a multilateral policy with rebates. 
Although the output losses in the non-manufacturing sectors are generally smaller when 
multilateral action is considered, the pattern of responses to the H.R. 2454 industry rebates with 
multilateral action is similar for the non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors. As 
expected, for the non-manufacturing sectors, coal and other fuel-producing industries see the 
biggest increase in prices (to the buyer, not the producer) associated with a unilateral, tax-only 
policy, and the biggest declines in sales. While the coal mining output loss is not significantly 
affected by the multilateral-policy assumption, the principal non-manufacturing gainers from 
the rebate policy are electric and gas utilities, as the LDC rebates substantially cushion the drop 
in demand that would otherwise occur.  
The effect of the carbon-pricing policies on profits is particularly pronounced. Tables 9 
and 10 display the no-rebate and the rebate cases, respectively. Recall that we define profits as 18 
the gross return to capital—i.e. sales revenue plus rebates (if applicable) minus purchases of 
intermediate inputs and labor costs. For comparison purposes, we also present the results for 
the very-short-run analysis, where we assumed that sellers could not raise prices to cover 
higher costs. 
Overall, while most U.S. industries benefit from a uniform carbon price applied in all 
Annex I countries, the gains are greatest in those sectors with less elastic demands, and more so 
for sectors receiving substantial rebates. Starting with the no-rebate case (Table 9), we see 
often-dramatic declines in adverse profit impacts across all industries as we move from the 
very–short-run, to the short-run with unilateral U.S. action, to the short-run with Annex I–wide 
policies. For example, other basic organic chemicals experiences a decline in profits of 84.3 
percent in the very short-run when the output price is fixed vs. a 5.0 percent decline in the 
short-run when they are free to raise output prices (assuming unilateral U.S. action). With 
Annex I–wide policies the reduction in profits is only 1.3 percent. Other industries see 
generally similar patterns. Overall, 25 of the 33 manufacturing industries and 5 of the 19 non-
manufacturing industries experience declines in profits of less than 1 percent with Annex I–
wide policies but no rebates. Of the remaining 14 non-manufacturing industries, 9 actually 
experience small profit increases.  
As shown in Table 10, roughly comparable patterns apply when the H.R. 2454 industry 
rebates are in place. With the rebates and unilateral U.S. action, the other basic organic 
chemicals sector experiences profit declines of 45.9 percent in the very short-run, dropping to 
2.7 in the short-run. If Annex I–wide policies are assumed, the profit decline is only 0.9 
percent. Note that in the multilateral case, all but 2 of the 33 manufacturing industries 
experience declines in profits of less than 1 percent.  
Among the non-manufacturing sectors, most experience declines in profits of less than 
1 percent in the short-run with or without the allocations to the EITE industries. The principal 
exceptions are the fossil fuel–producing sectors. Here, the very-short-run assumption of no 
change in output means a smaller loss compared to the short-run assumption, when the 
consumers of fossil fuels react to the carbon tax by buying less fuel. In the case of coal mining, 
in the very-short-run horizon, we see a 2.1 percent fall in profits without rebates. When we 
account for the reduction in coal use because of the higher prices, however, profits fall by 25.7 
percent in the unilateral case and 25.8 with an Annex I–wide carbon policy. Similar, albeit less 
dramatic patterns apply to oil and gas mining. The non-manufacturing industries experiencing a 
profit loss in excess of 1 percent in the short-run with the rebates in place are oil mining and 
gas mining, at 1.4 percent. An Annex I-wide carbon policy tends to modestly increase the profit 
losses for the oil and gas mining industries to 2.7 percent. 19 
A number of other interesting patterns are visible in the non-manufacturing sectors. Air 
transportation faces the largest profit decline in the very short-run without the rebates, followed 
by the electric utilities industry. With the LDC rebates, losses to the electric utilities industry 
are almost completely mitigated. In the very short-run, the profit impacts to the gas distribution 
industry are small in the tax-only case. While the rebates lead to a substantial windfall in the 
very short-run, the windfall disappears when customers reduce their demands in response to 
higher prices in the short-run case. Air transportation is virtually unaffected by the rebates 
because of the modest use of electricity in that sector, but the adverse effects of a carbon price 
dramatically decrease as the added costs of carbon pricing are passed forward to end users.  
Not surprisingly, the variation in output and profit impacts is sensitive to the breadth of 
the industrial categories considered. Within the chemicals group (NAICS 325), the very-short-
run change in profits (without rebates) varies by a factor of 20, from 4.0 percent in other 
chemicals and plastics to 84.3 percent in other basic inorganic chemicals. If we had averaged 
over the whole group, the low estimate for other chemicals and plastics would have dominated 
the results (see the output values in Table 2.) In earlier work, Morgenstern et al. (2004) found 
that sub-industry impacts estimated at a four-digit classification level (based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification) can be an order of magnitude larger those estimated at the two-digit 
level. As discussed in Appendix B, the availability of consistent information to serve as inputs 
to the relevant models dictated our choice of aggregation level.  
A further issue involves the scaling of results to different CO2 price levels. Since the 
calculations for both the very-short-run and short-run analyses are based on relatively simple 
linear models, they can be readily scaled up or down to reflect different assumptions about CO2 
prices. In contrast, in the medium- and long-run horizons examined below, the model explicitly 
involves nonlinearities that cannot be so readily scaled. At the same time, even for the short-run 
case, one has to be careful about considering large CO2 price changes, since the calculated 
demand elasticities, which are based on the multi-sector global CGE model, are strictly 
intended for marginal analysis. How the system would respond to large increases in prices is an 
issue that must be carefully considered.  
Effects on Output over the Four Time Horizons 
We next turn to comparing the shorter-run effects to those over the longer run. As noted 
in Section III, the global CGE model used to consider the longer horizons only identifies three 
digit–level industries for manufacturing, for a total of 29 sectors, compared to the 52 sectors 
just discussed. In order to compare them to the global model estimates, we first aggregate the 
results for the 52 industries in Tables 9 and 10 to the same 29 industrial categories using output 
values as weights (see Table 4b for a concordance between the 29-sector and 52-sector 20 
aggregations). Table 11 displays the effects of a $15/ton CO2 tax without the H.R. 2454 
industry rebates on output across the three modeling horizons. Comparable results with the 
H.R. 2454 industry rebates are displayed in Table 12.  
Recall that in the medium term, producers may substitute among all inputs except 
capital. Thus, firms may substitute labor for energy or gas for coal. However, only in the long-
run can firms move capital to other sectors and substitute it for energy or labor. Furthermore, in 
the general equilibrium framework, both producers and purchasers are changing their behavior, 
and these may have opposing effects on output over time. On the one hand, producers are 
substituting inputs to reduce costs and hence prices. Over time, lower prices should help raise 
sales and output. On the other hand, customers are making substitutions to avoid the higher 
prices for carbon-intensive products and thus reducing their demands and the corresponding 
sale of these products. 
Looking across the columns of Table 11, which excludes the H.R. 2454 industry rebates 
but includes alternative assumptions about unilateral U.S. vs. Annex I–wide carbon-pricing 
policies, we see the competing effects at work. Turning first to the unilateral policy case, of the 
13 manufacturing sectors that experience output declines in the short-run, the output declines in 
the medium-run are smaller for 11 of them. For example, in chemicals, output losses of 1.87 
percent are reduced to 1.86 percent. In non-metal mineral products, the output losses decline 
from 1.46 to 1.13 percent. The exceptions are petroleum products and fabricated metal 
products, which see a small increase in the output loss. For the special case of petroleum 
products, we use a smaller short-run elasticity of demand compared to the parameters in the 
global model. Thus output falls in the medium-run by 6.3 percent compared to 0.3 percent in 
the short-run. The two industries that experience output gains in the short-run—food, 
beverages, and tobacco and wearing apparel—also experience a worsening in the medium-run. 
For the non-manufacturing sectors, the medium-run output loss is larger in 5 of the 9 
industries that experience output declines in the short-run: agriculture, other minerals, gas 
utilities, construction, and transportation. Four industries had gains in the unilateral, short-run 
case, including trade, communication, finance and insurance, and services. For all of these 
industries, the gains were lower in the medium-run compared to the short-run. The short-run 
sees a sharp reduction in the use of coal and a smaller reduction in the use of gas. Allowing for 
input substitution over time seems to encourage a bigger switch to non-energy inputs, away 
from gas. The transportation sector’s ability to substitute toward non-carbon-intensive inputs 
seems limited and is dominated by the effect of customers shifting their purchases away from 
expensive transportation. Thus, the medium-run fall in output is considerably larger than it is in 
the short-run: 1.63 percent compared to 0.15 percent. 21 
In contrast to the medium-run, the long-run sees a substitution of capital for other 
inputs. Of the 14 manufacturing sectors that experience output declines in the medium-run, 10 
have output declines that are larger in the long-run, although for the most part the changes are 
relatively small. For example, the output decline in non-metal mineral products grows from 
1.13 percent in the medium term to 1.41 percent in the long term. On the other hand, in the 
machinery sector, the decline shrinks from 0.27 to 0.17 percent. Three industries see declines in 
the modest output losses they experience in the medium-run when moving to the long-run. 
Wearing apparel and other manufacturing experience slight output gains.  
Comparing the multilateral policy case with the unilateral policy case, the most notable 
differences are the responses of the manufacturing sectors in the medium-run versus the short-
run. In the unilateral case, all but two manufacturing sectors show a diminished output loss. In 
the multilateral case, the 13 industries that see output declines in the short-run are the same 
ones as in the unilateral case. However, only four have less pronounced output declines in the 
medium-run. For nine of them, the fall in output is bigger in the medium-run; for example, the 
fall in chemical output goes from 0.38 in the short-run to 1.25 percent in the medium-run. We 
emphasize, however, that the relative change is different from the absolute change. For a given 
time horizon, the multilateral policy has a smaller impact on output than the unilateral case in 
almost all industries. It is the relative change that can go in opposite directions. Similar 
outcomes occur for the multilateral and unilateral cases when moving from the medium- to the 
long-run.. In the multilateral policy case, 12 of the 15 manufacturing industries that experience 
output declines in the medium-run see larger declines in the long-run, compared to 10 out of 14 
in the unilateral case. 
Not surprisingly, the pattern of changes in the rebate case (Table 12) is generally similar 
to the no-rebate results, although not entirely so. As in the no-subsidy, unilateral policy case, 
the changes in manufacturing output in the medium-run are generally smaller than in the short-
run with the tax and rebate policy. Only in nonferrous primary metals, petroleum, chemicals, 
and fabricated metals are the medium-run losses (slightly) larger than the short-run losses (with 
larger losses in petroleum products being due to the choice of short-run elasticity as explained 
above). Going from the medium to long-run in the unilateral case, 7 of the 15 manufacturing 
sectors show slightly larger long-run output reductions compared to the medium-run.  
Importantly, the eight sectors that receive more significant subsidies in Table 4b 
(ranging from 0.17 percent to 7.23 percent of the value of industry output)—all of which 
experience output declines in the six no-subsidy cases presented in Table 11—experience lower 
output declines for the corresponding six subsidy cases in Table 12. The sole exceptions are 
petroleum and coal products, which shows slightly larger output losses in the two short-run 
subsidy cases (-0.59 versus -0.33 for the unilateral case and -0.67 versus -0.43 for the 22 
multilateral case), and paper and chemicals in the short-run multilateral case. Not surprisingly, 
this is not the case for the sectors that do not receive subsidies (or receive subsidies at rates that 
are very close to zero), since the subsidies will shift the relative burden of reductions onto non-
subsidized sectors. 
VI. Trade and Leakage 
A U.S. carbon-pricing policy will not only affect firms’ costs and corresponding prices, 
output, and short-run profits, but will also impact international trade and emissions leakage. 
Beyond the direct trade effects, changes in domestic and world prices due to carbon-pricing 
policies will further alter the pattern of exports and imports which, in turn, implies changes in 
the location of production and the possibility of additional emissions leakage. In Adkins et al. 
(forthcoming), we provide a detailed description of the methodology to estimate changes in 
trade and emissions leakage as well as a full set of findings; here we summarize some key 
results.  
In the face of a U.S. or Annex I carbon pricing policy, total CO2 emissions in countries 
without such policies can increase for two reasons: 1) the United States or Annex I countries 
increase net imports of carbon-intensive goods from countries without carbon pricing policies 
as these goods become more costly to produce in the United States or Annex I countries, and 2) 
fossil fuel consumption increases in non-policy countries as world energy prices fall in 
response to U.S. or Annex I demand reductions. The latter increase in fossil fuel consumption 
will induce higher carbon intensities in both production and household consumption in non-
policy countries. Thus, emissions leakage due to changes in net imports into countries with 
carbon pricing has two components—changes in the quantity of net imports and differences in 
the carbon intensities of production. The following discussion first considers trade impacts, and 
then turns to the consideration of price-induced increases in fossil fuel intensity in response to 
U.S. or Annex I demand reductions.  
Trade Impacts 
In previous sections, we estimate the changes in domestic output or production induced 
by the imposition of a domestic carbon pricing regime with and without accompanying output-
based rebates of the type incorporated in H.R. 2454. Yet these production changes do not 
necessarily impact domestic consumption on a one-for-one basis because some of the output 
reductions may be made up abroad. Specifically, the change in domestic production is equal to 
the changes in consumption plus exports minus imports (ignoring changes in inventories, which 
are not modeled; see equation A62 in Appendix A). The results without the rebates for the 23 
medium and long-run are displayed in Tables 13 and 13b. The results with the rebates are in 
Tables 14 and 14b.  
The first columns of Tables 13 and 14 are the base-year (2004) values for domestic 
output for the 29 commodities in the CGE model. In Tables 13a and 13b, the columns marked 
―Change in Output‖ are the effect on U.S. output of a $15/ton CO2 price applied unilaterally 
within the U.S. only and multilaterally within Annex I countries. In addition to the carbon 
pricing policy, Tables 14a and 14b include the impacts of the Waxman-Markey allocations 
(listed in Table 4b) applied in the U.S. The three columns under ―Contribution‖ show how 
changes in consumption, exports, and imports contribute to this output change. We see a varied 
set of trade impacts across the different sectors.  
For example, in Table 13a for a unilateral U.S. policy and no rebates, the output of the 
chemicals, rubber, and plastics sector falls by 1.86 percent. Of that amount, the fall in domestic 
consumption contributes 0.65 percentage points; the fall in exports, 0.85 points; and the 
increase in imports, 0.36 points (i.e., -1.86 = (-0.65) + (-0.86) – (0.36)). The fall in output does 
not lead to a corresponding fall in consumption, as imports increase to replace about 19 percent 
of the output reduction (i.e., (-0.36)/(-1.87)), and the diversion of exports to domestic use 
replaces another 45 percent (i.e., (-0.85)/(-1.87)). Thus, changes in net imports make up 65 
percent (= (-0.86 -0.36)/(-1.86)) of the output decline. We label this the ―trade impact‖ 
(equation A63b in Appendix A).20 Other energy-intensive industries (e.g., non-metallic mineral 
products, ferrous metals) also experience large changes in imports and exports. In less energy-
intensive industries, the output reductions are generally smaller, but the trade impacts are quite 
varied. For example, the fall in output of transportation equipment is 0.23 percent, while the 
trade impact is 23 percent; in the case of wood products the trade impact is even a small 
negative value since imports fall.  
With multilateral action, recall from Table 11 that changes in output for the energy-
intensive industries are uniformly lower than they are with a unilateral policy. Tables 13a and 
13b show that with multilateral action, changes in exports and imports are also almost always 
smaller than they are with a unilateral policy. For less energy-intensive industries, output losses 
as well as changes in exports and imports in the multilateral case are generally similar to those 
estimated with the unilateral policy. Thus, while the multilateral adoption of carbon-pricing 
policies reduces the overall reduction in domestic output compared to the unilateral case, it 
                                                 
20 Aldy and Pizer (2009) refer to this as the ―competitiveness impact.‖ Using statistical methods, they examine the 
case of a unilateral U.S. carbon pricing policy only.  24 
does not alter the relative trade impacts—i.e., the proportion of the production losses made up 
via changes in net imports.  
With the H.R. 2454 industry rebates in place, a generally similar pattern emerges, 
although there are some differences across industries. Of the 1.28 percent reduction in 
chemicals output in the medium-run unilateral case (Table 14), the fall in exports contributes 
0.61 percentage points and the rise in imports contributes 0.26 points, for a combined trade 
impact of 67 percent. That is, while the changes in the components are different from the no-
rebate case (Table 13), the trade impact is similar in both cases. For non-metallic mineral 
products, the fall in trade due to the rebates is smaller than for chemicals, and the trade impact 
is only 38 percent , compared to 53 percent without the rebates.  
Emissions Leakage at the Industry Level 
Moving beyond the trade impacts to estimate emissions leakage at the industry level, we 
now incorporate changes in international emissions intensity into the calculations. Specifically, 
we decompose the change in U.S. emissions from each sector into four elements: the change in 
consumption, the change in exports, the change in imports, and the change in the emissions 
intensity (see Figure 1 and equation A65 in Appendix A). The change in U.S. emissions due to 
changes in the quantities of consumption, exports, and imports correspond to those discussed in 
the previous section on trade impacts. The change in U.S. emissions (or Annex I emissions, in 
the multilateral case) due to changes in the emissions intensity of output reflects changes in 
input substitution as U.S. producers (or Annex I producers in the multilateral case) move 
toward less energy-intensive intermediate goods and less carbon-intensive sources of energy.  
Of the 14.95 million ton reduction in U.S. CO2 emissions from the chemicals, rubber, 
and plastics sector shown in the first column of Table 15, Figure 1 shows that the reduction in 
use accounts for 1.13 million tons, reduction of exports accounts for 1.31 tons, increased 
imports account for 0.26 tons, and input substitution accounts for 12.26 tons. The brown and 
yellow bars representing the change in trade flows are small relative to the total reduction in 
emissions for each industry. Of the manufacturing sectors, the largest trade effects are in 
chemicals, nonmetal mineral products, and ferrous metals sectors. Most of the projected 
reduction in emissions is due to the changes in the emissions intensity of production (when 
producers switch to less carbon-intensive sources of energy and intermediate inputs). 
Exceptions are petroleum refining and oil mining, which see relatively large declines in the 
demand for their output. For these sectors, the consumption effect is larger than the input 
substitution effect.  25 
Higher emissions in countries that do not implement carbon pricing policies offset the 
reduction in U.S. (and Annex I) emissions. The change in emissions in the non-policy regions 
is the sum of the changes in the levels of consumption, exports, and imports, as well as changes 
in the carbon intensity in the region. The interagency report (EPA 2009b), however, only 
considers the total increase in non-Annex I emissions arising from increased net exports to the 
United States (assuming non-policy countries have the same carbon intensities as the U.S.). We 
decompose a broader measure of trade-related leakage into the following: the contribution due 
to the higher quantity of net exports alone (equivalent to assuming other countries have the 
same carbon intensity as the U.S.), as addressed by the interagency report,  and also the 
contribution due to the differential carbon intensity.  
These trade-related leakage components are given in Table 15. The ―Total‖ column 
follows the interagency report in representing the change in the emissions of non-policy 
countries due to changes in their net exports to the United States. We break down this concept 
into three components: the change in emissions due to changes in the quantity of exports to the 
United States, the change in emissions due to changes in the quantity of imports from the 
United States (both measured at U.S. carbon intensities), and the change in emissions due to 
differences in carbon intensity. For example, U.S. emissions in the chemicals, rubber, and 
plastics sector fall by 14.95 million tons in the multilateral no-rebate case. Total emissions from 
non-Annex I countries’ net exports of chemicals, rubber, and plastics to the U.S. are higher by 
3.96 million tons, of which 0.57 million tons are due to higher exports to the United States, 
0.66 million tons are due to lower imports from the United States, and 2.73 million tons are due 
to higher emissions intensity than in the United States. Dividing 3.96 by 14.95 yields a trade-
related leakage rate of 26.5 percent. Using the methodology adopted in the interagency report, 
the corresponding leakage estimate would be a lower 8.2 percent (=(0.57+ 0.66)/14.95). 
The total trade-related leakage rates from the final column in Table 15 are shown in 
Figure 2, where they are decomposed into ―trade-quantity‖ (i.e., combined exports and imports) 
and ―emissions-intensity‖ effects, represented by the blue and shaded brown bars, respectively. 
Among the large energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, the chemicals, rubber, and plastics 
sector has the highest leakage rate (26.5 percent), followed by ferrous metals (15.0 percent), 
and nonferrous primary metals (13.4 percent). For nonferrous metals, the emissions-intensity 
effect (due to differences in production techniques) is small, while it accounts for more than 
half the leakage for ferrous metals. We can also see that six manufacturing industries have 
negligible leakage rates because of their low energy intensities.  
The results in Table 15 are for the multilateral case without rebates. Table 16 compares 
the leakage results from Table 15 with the rebate case. Although we saw earlier that rebates 
generally were effective in reducing or even reversing sectoral output losses (Tables 11 and 26 
12), they do not reduce all trade-related leakage. In every case, however, the reduction in 
manufacturing-sector emissions is smaller with rebates. The rebates reduce import competition 
as well as the size of the adjustment. Recall that the leakage rate at the industry level is the 
change in emissions due to trade divided by the change in U.S. emissions; in the case with 
rebates, both the numerator and denominator may be smaller. Thus, as can be seen in Table 16, 
the trade-related leakage rate with rebates may be larger or smaller compared to the no-rebate 
case.  
Aggregate Leakage 
We now turn to emissions leakage by country or region. Here we decompose the change 
in total country emissions into changes for industry and households. We further decompose 
industry changes into changes in output levels and carbon intensity (due to input substitution). 
Table 17 presents the decomposition of the change in emissions for countries adopting carbon 
pricing policies and for non-policy countries, for the unilateral U.S. and Annex I cases, each 
with and without rebates. We focus here on the long-run (i.e., mobile capital) case.  
The first column of Table 17 displays the base-year level of emissions: the United 
States contributed 6,070 million tons of CO2 emissions, or 23 percent of global emissions. In 
the unilateral no-rebate case, U.S. emissions fall by 11.5 percent, or 697 million tons of CO2. 
The bottom panel of Table 17 shows that 68.4 percent is due to changes in the input mix, while 
lower levels of output contribute 20.0 percent, and changes in household consumption 
contribute 11.6 percent. Thus, the majority of the total CO2 reduction in the U.S. is due to a fall 
in the carbon intensity in the electricity, transportation, and other energy-intensive sectors. 
Changes in the quantity of electricity, transportation, and manufactured goods produced 
contributes only about a fifth of the total U.S. emissions reduction.  
With a unilateral carbon-pricing policy, emissions increase by 146 million tons in the 
non-policy countries (i.e., in the seven other countries/regions that constitute the rest of the 
world in this scenario), offsetting almost 21 percent of the U.S. reduction (i.e., the aggregate 
leakage rate). An increase in the carbon intensity of non-policy countries contributes 58.2 
percent of the 146 million ton emissions increase. Higher industry output, part of which is 
exported to the United States, contributes 32.4 percent, while higher household emissions in the 
ROW contribute 9.5 percent. Thus, the biggest cause of leakage is the higher use of energy in 
the production processes in the ROW when the United States adopts a carbon-pricing regime. 
Higher output in the non-policy countries is also important, partly to cover their increased net 
exports of carbon-intensive goods to the United States and partly to satisfy their higher demand 
for the now less-expensive fossil fuels and energy- intensive goods.  27 
With the H.R. 2454 industry rebates, U.S. emissions fall by 9.5 percent, and the 
aggregate leakage rate is 21.7 percent—slightly larger than in the no-rebate case. This may 
appear counterintuitive because the rebates are supposed to reduce changes in trade flows. 
However, the rebates also reduce the U.S. output changes, which in turn reduce the fall in U.S. 
emissions. There is a smaller reduction of world energy prices with the rebates, leading to a 
smaller increase in energy consumption in the no-policy regions. Mathematically, both the 
numerator and denominator of the leakage rate are reduced. We should note that a substantial 
portion of the rebates go to cover higher costs in the electricity sector, meaning that 
conservation of electricity use by the non-traded part of the economy is only slightly 
encouraged by the rebate policy.  
We now turn to the case of multilateral action by all Annex I countries. U.S. emissions 
fall by 663 million tons (10.9 percent) compared to 697 in the unilateral case. Emissions in the 
other Annex I countries implementing the same carbon price fall by 843 million tons, resulting 
in total Annex I reductions of 1,506 million tons. Emissions in the non-policy (i.e.,  non-Annex 
I) countries rise by 255 million tons for an aggregate leakage rate of 17 percent, a rate more 
than 4 percentage points lower than in the unilateral case. The composition of the increase in 
the non-policy region emissions is quite different from the unilateral case: 82 percent is due to 
input substitution, while changes in output levels are close to zero and households contribute a 
relatively small 18 percent.  
In the multilateral case with rebates, U.S. emissions fall by 539 million tons and the 
total Annex I reduction is 1,388 million tons. The rise in non-Annex I emissions generates a 
leakage rate of 17.8 percent compared to 17.0 percent without rebates. Although the rise in 
non-Annex I emissions in absolute tons is lower, the fall in Annex I  emissions is even smaller 
and the aggregate leakage rate thus rise slightly.  
Comment on Leakage Rates 
A  number  of  factors  influence  industry  and  aggregate  leakage  rates.  Burniaux  and 
Oliveira  Martins  (2000)  use  a  simplified  CGE  model  to  look  for  key  determinants  of  the 
magnitude  of  leakage  rates.  Of  the  mechanisms  they  examine,  they  find  that  the  supply 
elasticity of coal and the model’s production structure have the most influence on leakage rates. 
With their preferred parameter values and model structure, they find generally low aggregate 
leakage rates.  
Model closure, wherein exchange rates adjust to ―close‖ the foreign trade account, also 
may have some influence on leakage rates. In our static model, the trade balance is assumed 
unchanged by the carbon policy and an exchange rate closes this account. A dynamic model 28 
with a transition period that allows trade balances to adjust would likely produce different 
changes in trade flows and leakage rates.  
Industry leakage is sensitive to the import elasticities. The elasticities in our global CGE 
model are drawn from the GTAP 7 database. While relatively disaggregated for a global CGE 
model, many of the manufacturing sectors are averages across heterogeneous products. In turn, 
the  elasticities  are  averages  and  may  not  reflect  well  the  import  responses  for  certain 
subsectors.  If  we  were  able  to  use  the  same  set  of  sectors  that  are  available  in  the  more 
disaggregated  I-O  model,  import  responses  and  leakage  likely  would  be  greater  for  some 
sectors than is currently captured in our global model. Other sectors likely would have smaller 
impacts.  
VII. Conclusions 
Inevitably, any broad-based carbon-pricing policy will have disproportionate impacts on 
energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries. In response to the introduction of such a carbon 
pricing regime, we find that changes in the carbon intensity of U.S. production are the biggest 
contributor to total emissions reductions. At the same time, domestic production, profits, and 
U.S. exports and imports are adversely affected. The key policy development challenges are to 
1) identify the industries with the largest output and/or profit losses and understand the full 
extent and likely duration of the impacts; 2) estimate the trade impacts and emissions leakage 
associated with the domestic carbon-pricing scheme; and 3) assess to what extent the various 
impacts are mitigated by offsetting policies, including output-based rebates of the type 
contained in H.R. 2454, and the implementation of comparable pricing policies in other 
nations.  
We use four modeling approaches as a proxy for the time horizons over which firms can 
pass through added costs, change the input mix, adopt new technologies, and reallocate capital. 
While our modeling analyses are based on a fairly detailed list of industries, further 
disaggregation would certainly show an even broader range of responses. With this caveat, 
examination of the results of a $15/ton CO2 price combined with a set of H.R. 2454-style 
output-based rebates for EITE industries over what we label the very-short-, short-, medium-, 
and long-run horizons yields a number of observations:  
 
  Measured by the reduction in domestic output, a readily identifiable set of industries is 
at greatest risk of contraction over both the short and long terms. Within the 
manufacturing sector, at a relatively aggregate, three- or four-digit NAICS industry 
classification level, the hardest-hit industries without rebates are petroleum refining, 29 
chemicals and plastics, ferrous metals, nonferrous metals, and nonmetallic mineral 
products.  
  The use of the H.R. 2454 rebates can significantly offset the output losses over all four 
time frames considered. In the short-run, within manufacturing the biggest relative 
dampening of output losses occurs in ferrous metals, nonferrous metals, and 
nonmetallic mineral products. In the non-manufacturing sector, the output losses of the 
electric and gas utilities sectors shrink even more dramatically.  
  Industries’ ability to raise prices in the face of the domestic carbon-pricing policy is key 
to their sustained profitability. With or without rebates, the loss of profits is much 
smaller in the short-run compared to the very short-run, where it is assumed that higher 
costs cannot be passed on.  
  Focusing on the nearer-term time frames, where certain simplifying assumptions allow 
for a more disaggregated analysis, we observe that the greatest harm is concentrated in 
particular sub-segments of the three-digit industries. Without the rebates, the biggest 
short-run output losses in the manufacturing sector occur in other basic organic 
chemicals, aluminum, petrochemicals, artificial fibers, and plastic and material resins. 
With the rebates, the biggest output declines are in other basic organic chemicals, 
plastic and material resins, textiles, and lime and gypsum. With the rebates, the biggest 
fall in short-run profits are in these same industries, when some higher costs are passed 
on to customers.  
  Many of the non-manufacturing industries benefit from the switch of expenditures away 
from carbon-intensive commodities, and so the impact of the policy on their output is 
more varied. With the rebates, the output of coal mining recovers substantially over the 
medium term as output in manufacturing and electric utilities recover. However, over 
the long-run, when capital is allowed to adjust, there is greater substitution away from 
coal and output falls further. In services, output initially expands with the expenditure 
switch, but over time as the other industries reduce their cost shock this effect is 
diminished.  
  While the changes in output resulting from the domestic carbon-pricing regime reflect 
changes in U.S. industrial activity, they do not fully reflect changes in consumption. To 
understand the latter, one needs to consider the changes in exports and imports. 
Although the results vary considerably by industry, overall, we find that with or without 
H.R. 2454 industry rebates, the fall in exports and rise in imports of manufactures offset 
about half of the fall in U.S. output. Thus, the reduction in consumption is much smaller 
than the reduction in output.  30 
  The emissions leakage, or change in emissions outside the U.S., is defined to include 
increased net exports to the U.S. as well as the effect of importing from countries with 
higher carbon intensities. Overall, this trade-related leakage effect is relatively modest 
for most industries, on the order of several percentage points for the energy-intensive 
industries, in line with the results presented in the interagency report (EPA 2009b).  
  We also consider a broader definition of industry leakage which includes the effect of 
increased fossil fuel consumption in those countries not undertaking a carbon-pricing 
policy. In this more comprehensive measure, the leakage rates are considerably higher. 
In the absence of the H.R. 2454 industry rebates, we estimate that the long-run leakage 
rate associated with unilateral U.S. action, including the input substitutions occurring in 
the non-policy nations, is 21 percent when viewed across the entire economy. With the 
rebates in place, the leakage rate itself rises to 21.7 percent. This small increase reflects 
the fact that along with the trade impacts and the input substitutions occurring in the 
non-policy countries, the rebates themselves encourage U.S. production, thereby 
increasing U.S. emissions compared to the non-rebate case. With the assumption of 
parallel action by other Annex I nations, the overall leakage rate falls to 17 percent 
without rebates and 17.5 percent with them.  31 
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Appendix A: Methodology to Estimate the Effect of a Carbon-Pricing Policy with 
Offsetting Provisions 
This appendix describes our methodology to estimate the effects of carbon policies over 
various time horizons. In section A.1, we lay out the calculation of the changes to prices, 
output, and profits. In A.2, we describe the treatment of the H.R. 2454 quota allocations. In 
A.3, we discuss leakage formulas. 
A.1 Methodology for Analyzing Short-Run Effects 
This section describes our methodology to estimate the effects of carbon policies over 
the very short and short-run. The policies include a simple carbon tax and a tax that has 
provisions to offset some adverse impacts to specific industries. In both cases, revenues from 
these taxes are transferred back to households. 
We follow fairly standard input–output conventions for the notation in the following 
equations (e.g., Miller and Blair 2009). To have a full accounting of all carbon sources and 
users, we construct a complete set of accounts for all n industries. We carefully distinguish 
between values and quantities.  
Let   denote the price of industry j output to buyers, and   and   denote the price 
of labor and capital inputs. The value of industry j’s output at buyers’ prices is equal to the 
value of inputs plus taxes on production: 
 
(A1)    
 
where   is the quantity of output and   is the intermediate input of commodity i into sector j 
purchased at prices  .   and   are the labor and capital inputs. A matrix whose j
th column is 
the input vector of commodities used by industry j is the ―use‖ matrix: 
 
(A2)    
 
Both the detailed industry accounts and input–output tables distinguish between 
industries and commodities; they are classified using the same names and reference numbers. 
The hotel industry for example, produces a ―hotel lodging‖ commodity and a ―restaurant‖ 
commodity. And on the other side, each commodity may be produced by several industries; for 
example, the restaurant commodity is produced by the hotel and restaurant industries, and the 34 
electricity commodity is produced by electric services, federal electric utilities, and S&L 
government electric utilities. In the notation above,   is the use of commodity i by industry j.  
 The ―activity‖ matrix, B, gives the amount of input i required for one unit of output j: 
 
(A3)   
 
The row sum of the use matrix is  , where   is a vector of ones. The 
corresponding use of labor and capital per unit output are denoted as: 
 
(A4)   
 
In Part 1 where we analyze the very short-run, we assume that the input mix cannot be 
changed, or that the activity matrix   is not affected by carbon control policies. 
Total final demand,  , is the demand for domestic commodity i by the final users— 
consumption, investment, government, and net exports. This corresponds to the familiar 
expression for gross domestic product: GDP = C + I + G + X - M. Thus, for commodity i: 
 
(A5)   
 
We will need to consider, separately, gross final domestic demand that excludes net exports: 
 
(A5b)   
 
Let   denote the supply of domestic commodity i. The supply–demand balance is 
written as: 
 
(A6)   
In vector form this becomes: 
 
(A6b)   
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where   is a vector of ones. The corresponding equation in value terms is simply 
  . Since each commodity may be produced by a few industries, we use the 
―Make‖ or ―Supply‖ matrix: 
 
(A7)   
 
where   gives the value of commodity i produced by industry j. The vector of industry output 
is the row sum of the supply matrix,  ; and the vector of commodity output is the 
column sum,  . Let the share of commodity i produced by industry j be denoted by 
. Then the relation between industry output and commodity supply is given by: 
 
(A8)    
 
We also use the industry proportion matrix, C, which gives the share of industry j’s output 
going to commodity i: 
 
(A9)   
 
By putting (A3) and (A8) into (A6), we obtain the following well-known relationship 
between final demand and domestic output (e.g. Miller and Blair 2009): 
 
(A10)   
 
where   is the identity matrix.   is known as the Leontief inverse, and it tells us that 
to produce a vector   of final demand commodities, the economy must produce a vector   of 
gross output of commodities. In particular, this formulation expresses the additional outputs 
that must be produced if we want the economy to produce an extra unit of commodity i for final 
users. For example, if we want to produce one more dollar’s worth of motor vehicles, the 
economy must produce additional steel, glass, electricity, etc., which the motor vehicle industry 
buys as inputs. However, steel production needs motor vehicles, electricity, coal, etc., and 
electricity needs steel, coal, etc. The Leontief inverse gives us the grand total of extra 
electricity, coal, etc. that is required for the economy to produce one more dollar of motor 
vehicles.  
The vector of additional output needed for one unit of i is thus given by: 36 
 
(A11)   
 
where   is a vector with a 1 in the ith element, and zeros everywhere else. Writing out the 




















With this formulation, we can estimate the total additional carbon emissions due to one more 
unit of commodity i since the vector   gives us the additional coal, crude oil, and gas used.  
Let   be the carbon dioxide (CO2) content per unit of fuel f, where the units are the 
base-year million dollars of fuel f. For example,   312 metric tons of CO2 per million 
dollars of output in 2006 (see Table 2). This is derived from the energy content per unit fuel 
(e.g., BTU’s per ton of coal), the carbon content per BTU, and the average price per unit fuel ($ 
per ton).  
If fuels did not have non-combustion uses, then the direct and indirect emissions due to 
producing one unit of commodity i may be derived simply by multiplying the primary energy 
elements in   by their respective carbon content coefficients. Let   denote the total carbon 





i coal coal oil oil gas gas
i








where  is the vector of carbon coefficients with non-zero entries 
only for the primary fuels. Although the   vector also gives us the additional electricity and 
additional refined petroleum products used, we do not include them in the calculation because 
these are secondary products. Clearly, it is the production, not the use of, electricity that 
generates CO2, as captured by the coal, oil, and gas elements. Similarly, gasoline, kerosene, etc. 
are captured at the crude oil stage. 
However, crude oil and gas are used as feedstock in the production of chemicals and 
other products that are not combusted, so that their carbon is not released. Refined petroleum 
products include lubricants and waxes that are also not combusted. If the carbon-pricing policy 37 
exempts such non-fuel use, then the formulas should reflect that. To take these into account, we 
introduce a combustion ratio   that represents only the combusted portion. We have to 
distinguish carefully between two types of processes. In our modeling approach,   is the 
proportion of fuel i that is combusted by industry j, a number less than or equal to one. As an 
example, the gas that is turned into fertilizer and not combusted is represented by the feedstock 
ratio,  . The crude oil that is converted to refined products is not 
combusted in the refining industry but is eventually combusted by downstream users. In this 
case, the emissions of the refining industry are represented by multiplying the crude oil input 
by a small ratio: 
 
    
 
The carbon emitted by households, or industry j, is calculated by multiplying the 
gasoline purchased from refining by the emissions coefficient of oil products, and by the 
combustion ratio recognizing that lubricants and such are not combusted. Similarly, for the 
other fuels and summing together: 
 
(A14)   
 
Unlike eq. (A13), where we considered only the primary fuels, we need to include a separate 
account for refined petroleum and gas utilities when we recognize non-fuel uses.  
To have this separate accounting, we begin by expressing total national emissions as the 
sum of the industries and domestic final demand use of fuel f, and then we sum all fuels: 
 
(A14b)    
 
 
The combustion use of fuel f in industry j is the quantity used   multiplied by a combustion 
ratio,  . National emissions also include those from households and government represented 
in the final demand vector E





























Where   is the Hadamard product and i is a vector of ones. The vector of the change in 
direct and indirect CO2 emissions due to one more unit of final demand is obtained by 
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The change in emissions due to one more unit of commodity i used by final demand is: 
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The change in emissions due to the production of one more unit of i is only the first term: 
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The distinction between eq. (17a) and (17) only matters for the energy commodities. Eq. (A17) 
represents the (minor) emissions in producing a ton of coal, for example, and (A17a) represents 
the emissions due to the production and combustion of a ton of coal. 
We should emphasize the difference between eq. (A13) and (A17), the second of which 
includes the combustion ratio term. The ratio is very different from 1.0, and eq. (A17) thus 
generates a very different estimate of the carbon intensity for some products. The construction 
of the combustion ratios is described in Appendix B. 
The proposed carbon-pricing policies consist of a few distinct elements: a carbon price 
(due to a carbon tax or emission permits), free allocation of some permits based on historical 
output or current output, special targets for electric utilities, and restrictions on imports using 
carbon tariffs or special rules. Some legislative proposals include a provision that quotas or 
compensation be given to the local distribution companies (LDCs) to limit electricity price 
increases. Our model represents such a policy as a subsidy to the output of the electric utilities 39 
industry. In the case of the H.R. 2454, the subsidy rate is determined by a free allocation of 
emissions permits equal to 30 percent of total covered emissions and the 2006 industry output 
for electric utilities. 
To take the first element into account, we represent the effect of a carbon price as a tax 
on the primary fossil fuels in proportion to the carbon content. Given the additional carbon 
embodied in one unit of commodity i, assuming the fixed input–output structure and assuming 
no change in pricing behavior, the carbon tax at rate $ /ton will result in the cost of producing 
i rising by: 
 
(A18) 
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To take into account the output-based quota allocations or other kinds of subsidies, we 
introduce a ―carbon price–offset subsidy‖ for the sellers of commodity i:  . Taxes or subsidies 
may be expressed either ad valorem, per dollar, or per physical unit. Because our level of 
aggregation does not include simple items, such as tons of steel coils, we use the more 
convenient subsidy per dollar of sales. Together with a carbon price, this subsidy changes the 
cost and, as a result, the price of non-energy commodity i by: 
 
(A19) 
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If the subsidy policy ties the subsidy rate only to the electricity consumed, we label it as 
. When it ties the rate to electricity and the use of fossil fuels, we label it as  .
21 
The purchaser’s price of commodity i is the seller price plus taxes, which includes the 
carbon tax on the output of the coal mining, oil mining, gas mining, and refining industries. The 
change in price to purchasers of i is therefore: 
 
(A19b)  
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To repeat,   is only non-zero for i=coal, oil, gas, refining-lpg, refining-other, and gas 
utilities. That is, the producers of refined products face higher costs of burning crude and in the 
long-run would charge a higher price to cover the higher costs, less any subsidies. In addition, 
                                                 
21 Note that the  policy is based on 25 percent of an industry’s indirect emissions—a point discussed in more detail 
later in Appendix A. No policy proposals include consideration of the higher costs of non-fuel intermediates, and 
we do not develop that option here. 40 
the policy puts a carbon tax on the carbon content of the refined products, so the price to users 
of gasoline in the long-run changes according to the three terms on the right side of A19b. 
As explained in section A.2 below, the various pieces of proposed legislation have 
different subsidies. For each scenario the change in price is: 
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H.R. 2454 especially subsidizes electricity sales and compensates certain industries that 
are deemed energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors (EITEs). The implicit subsidy that results 
from permit allocations determined by an industry’s direct fuel consumption is denoted by 
. The implicit subsidy that results from EITE allocations based on industry’s indirect 
emissions is denoted by  . This price change will affect both producers and final 
demand (C, I, G, X). The additional cost to final users is the change in price multiplied by the 
quantity purchased of each commodity. The total cost to all final users of a $  carbon tax, 
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The change in costs of industry j is the change in the prices of inputs multiplied by the 
quantity of inputs that are assumed to be unchanged in the very-short-run case. The total 
increase in current costs per dollar of output j is: 
 
(A21) 
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We model the carbon tax as if it only applies to the combusted portion by multiplying the input 
matrix B by the combustion ratio  .  
We also want to separate out the total effect on costs into the contributions of primary 
fuels, electricity, and all other intermediate inputs. That is: 
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The directly combusted primary fuels component is the sum of coal, oil, and gas commodities: 
 41 
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Note that in the absence of subsidies, the above components are given simply by the 
carbon contributions.   denotes the CO2 per dollar of industry output due to the direct 
combustion of fossil fuels;   denotes the CO2 per dollar of industry output due to electricity 
consumption. The higher cost is simply the carbon tax multiplied by the carbon content:  
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Because we are interested in the total effect on an industry, we need to distinguish 
between quantities and values, sales revenues and profits. The gross sales revenue is  , and 
net sales revenue ( ) is the gross minus ―net taxes on production‖ (sales tax). The sales 
tax consists of the existing taxes plus the new carbon tax and any new subsidies for carbon 
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Let   denote the existing tax on sales and the new subsidy rate for carbon price offset be  . 
With the carbon tax, the purchaser pays a total of: 
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while the seller receives: 
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where  XO
j P denotes the total revenue received per unit of output by the producer—i.e., the 
―seller’s price‖ plus subsidy. Let   denote the gross return to capital—i.e., sales revenue 
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A.1.1 The Very-Short-Run Horizon 
In the very-short-run scenario, quantities cannot be changed. Thus, we calculate the 
effect of the carbon charge on profits for j as if customers do not buy less due to higher prices. 
This effect is best regarded as occurring only in the very short-run before the market settles 
down to a new equilibrium. In Figure A1, this effect is represented by a movement from the 
original equilibrium point A, to the temporary point B vertically above A. Over time, the 
market moves to point F. In the very short-run, however, we only focus on industry j and how 
the higher input prices of all non-j commodities affect its profits. We also regard labor prices to 
be unchanged in this case. In terms of Figure A1, the buyers continue to pay   at point A, but 
the producer faces costs represented at B, with no change in quantities. In the absence of new 
subsidies, the producer suffers a loss equal to the rectangle defined by side AB. If the producer 
receives a subsidy, the loss is the rectangle defined by side AC. The change in gross profit to 
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Under the assumption that quantities are unchanged and the output price, excluding the 
subsidy, is fixed, the change in profits is simply the per dollar change in cost given in (21) 
multiplied by total output quantity plus subsidies. This definition of changes in very-short-run 
profits is somewhat inconsistent because we consider how the carbon tax results in higher input 
prices,  , while at the same time assuming that output prices,  , are unchanged for all 
industries. We define it in this manner to reflect the industry argument that costs will rise 
because of a carbon fee but industry will not be able to raise prices or change input quantities. 
This setup also is a simple, transparent representation of the maximum impact on profits from 
the higher costs and ignores the fact that input commodity i is some other industry’s output. 43 
The percentage change in very-short-run profits is simply the weighted share of the 
percentage change in input prices: 
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A.1.2 The Short-Run Horizon 
In the short-run case, we consider a situation in which producers raise their output 
prices to cover the higher costs but still are not able to substitute cheaper inputs for more 
expensive carbon-intensive ones. The higher price covers the higher costs but dampens demand 
along the demand curve. In the absence of new subsidies, we arrive at the new equilibrium 
point D in Figure A2. We now have to make an assumption about the effect of the output 
subsidy to offset the carbon price. Consider Figure A2, where the subsidy shifts the long run 
supply curve out to S2, i.e. when input substitutions are possible.  
One could assume that competition would let producers raise prices only to the extent 
that the new price plus subsidy exactly covers the higher costs. This would mean moving to 
point E in Figure A2. Alternatively, one could assume that in the short-run, producers raise 
prices by the amount of the higher costs, and the subsidy is an added revenue source to 
compensate the reduction in demand. This means that the producer is at point D, selling a 
quantity   in Figure A2. We believe the first case is more appropriate and focus on point E 
in the following discussion. 
The revenue raised is assumed to be transferred back to households who can then spend 
it on consumption. We also have to take into account the income effect of the higher prices: the 
higher price, on electricity say, will lead to a reduction in the quantity of household electricity 
consumed, but less than in proportion. The expenditures on electricity will thus be higher, 
leading to less spending on other items. There is also a fall in profits that reduces household 44 
disposable income. This is explained below in (A61). We assume that the revenue transferred, 
and the income diverted, affects spending in proportion to current consumption patterns as 
represented by ci in equation (A5). That is, we assume there is an increase in final demand for 
commodity i due to the net income change, 
rr
i E  , equal to: 
 
(A30)      
 
where  is the new transfer to household, less income diverted, as a share of total personal 
consumption expenditures,  . Equation (A62) below defines the allocation to households, 
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For each percentage point increase in price, the producer j will make and sell   percent less. 
In this short-run case, we assume that producers raise the output price by the amount of the 
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The price to purchasers of j’s output is given in eq. (A25), and that is changed by this higher 
seller’s price plus the new carbon tax/permit price: 
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The carbon tax ( in eq. 23) is positive only for j=coal, oil and gas. The change in price is: 
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The percent change in sales and output due to an increase in price to cover the higher 
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The increase in demand for industry output due to revenue recycling and other income effects 
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The total percentage change in sales due to the price change and this income effect is then: 
 
(A36c)  










As in the very short-run case we assume that labor prices are unchanged. However, all 
quantities other than capital input may change in this case. In respond to the lower demand, the 
domestic producers will make less and buy proportionally fewer variable inputs. Let   
denote the change in the quantity of output produced. The change in intermediate input i and 
labor use are given by: 
 
 (A37)  []
X
j rr
ij ij j ij j j j X
j
dp
dU B dX B X X
p
     
  []
X
j L L rr
j j j j j j j X
j
dp
dL b dX b X X
p
     
 
Note, however, that we continue to hold fixed the amount of input per unit output, i.e.,  
. That is, while we allow the customers of j to respond to higher prices, here the 
producers are still unable to adjust the input mix by substituting cheaper inputs for the more 
expensive carbon-intensive ones. 46 
 
Profits are given by sales revenues plus subsidies less variable costs, changing eq. (A26) to: 
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The change in profits in this short-run case is the change in revenues less the change in 
costs, both of which are split into price change and quantity change: 
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Recall that the value share of profits in sales revenue is denoted by   (eq. A29), and the 
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 s=no subsidy, elect, total 
 
Compared to the change for the very-short-run case given in eq. (A28), the above 
expression has three additional terms: the effect of higher sales prices, the effect of higher 
prices on reducing quantities of input and output (recall that is   is negative), and the effect of 
purchasers responding to the carbon tax on the three fossil fuel commodities, where   by 
reducing quantities. In other words, the customers of fossil fuel industries not only face more 
costly fuels due to the higher costs of producing fuels, but also the carbon tax on the fuels. 
The net effect on profits is ambiguous in the very short-run because the subsidies could 
be so large as to overcompensate for the higher costs. In the short-run, too, the ambiguity 
carries over, and an additional unknown is how the higher prices offset lower quantity of sales. 
A.2 Quota Allocations and Other Adjustments 
Quota Allocations and Subsidy Rates 
Under the H.R. 2454 and other bills, specific industries qualify for assistance in the 
form of emissions allowance rebates or other subsidies. In H.R. 2454, special treatment is given 
to four main groups relevant to our analysis: electric utilities (specifically via electricity LDCs), 
natural gas LDCs, petroleum refining, and EITE industries. Electricity LDCs receive an 
allocation of emission permits equal to 30 percent of the total amount of permits, and natural 
gas distribution companies receive 9 percent of total permits. Petroleum refining (excluding the 
.25 percent allocation given to small business refineries) receives a constant 2 percent of total 
allowances. For EITE industries, emission rebates correspond with historical direct energy and 
electricity consumption.  
To be deemed an EITE industry, a manufacturing industry must either have an energy 
or greenhouse gas intensity larger than 5 percent and a trade intensity larger than 15 percent, or 
have an energy or greenhouse gas intensity larger than 20 percent. If a manufacturing industry 
meets one of these requirements, they will receive emissions permits to offset cost increases, as 
detailed in Sec. 764 of H.R. 2454. Note that the trade intensity is calculated as exports plus 
imports divided by the quantity obtained by summing the industry’s value of shipments and 
imports. 48 
Because the 30 percent allocation to electric utilities will benefit industries as well as 
residential consumers, some EITE industries possibly would receive dual benefits: one from 
suppressed electricity price increase and the other from an allocation of emissions permits that 
depends on historical electricity consumption. To prevent this, the legislation (subparagraph D 
of Sec. 764) states that EITE permit allocation will be ―adjusted‖ so that EITE industries do not 
receive permits for costs increases not incurred due to the LDC allocation to reduce electricity 
price increases. We implement this clause by allocating 25 percent of the indirect carbon factor 
calculated under the legislation. As the LDC allocation is likely to benefit large industrial users 
of electricity, the allocation to natural gas distribution companies is likely to benefit EITE 
industries that obtain natural gas from distribution companies (as opposed to obtaining it 
straight from the mine).  
The calculation of the H.R. 2454 allocations begins with the list of presumptively 
eligible sectors classified at the six-digit North American Industry Classification System level 
provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. This list includes the value of 
shipments of these eligible sectors, and we use it to calculate a weighted share of eligible 















For 2006, we estimated that the electric utilities contributed to about 40 percent of U.S. 
fossil fuel–related CO2 emissions. The electricity allocation thus results in a subsidy covering 
about three quarters of the higher costs of generating electricity. If the permit allocation would 
completely cover the higher costs, we would compute its value by multiplying the carbon price 
with the carbon content (carbon intensity multiplied by the output): 
 
(A44)  
, value DC C DC V
j j j R t X     j=electric utilities 
 












  j =electric utilities 
 
H.R. 2454 specifies that 30 percent of the national cap will be allocated to electric utilities, 
however, so we calculate the as allocation as: 49 
 
(A45b)      
where j =electric utilities, and   is the national U.S. emissions of CO2 in 2006.  
 
Given this offset to cushion the impact of electricity prices in H.R. 2454, we compute 
the amount of allowances rebated to the EITE industries based on their ―direct carbon factor‖ 
and 25 percent of their indirect carbon factor.
22 In our model, the suppressed electricity price 
increase is enjoyed by all industries as well as final demand, and electricity allocation 
effectively compensates the electric utilities industry for about 75 percent of their emissions. 
This direct combustion allowance is the carbon intensity multiplied by the qualifying share of 
the industry’s output in 2006: 
 
(A46)      
 
The value of the rebates is simply the allowance multiplied by the carbon price: 
 
(A47)     
 
The rate of subsidy for industry output embodied in this rebate is thus: 
 
(A48)       
 
Note that this subsidy rate is zero for most of our 52 industries; it is only positive for the few 
with a positive  .  
Current legislation, however, recognizes the emissions embodied in electricity 
consumption and provides rebates to EITE industries based on their indirect carbon factor, 
which is determined by annual output, electricity intensity, and electricity efficiency for each 
industry. To calculate this, we begin with the electricity efficiency for industry j, expressed as 
the kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity input per dollar (2006$) of gross output.  
                                                 
22 Note that as a result of natural gas LDC allocations, we use only 25 percent of natural gas consumption to 
determine the direct carbon factor in our model. 50 
We derive this intensity from our estimates of total electricity. In Appendix B, we 
explain how we developed energy use by industry using Manufacturing Energy Consumption 
Survey data. The electricity input is the dollar value in our rescaled input–output use table 
divided by the national average price of a kWh. We denote this energy intensity by: 
 
(A49)      
 
We further define the carbon intensity for electricity use in industry j as the metric tons 
of CO2 per million kWh in output: 
 
(A50)     
 
The allowance rebated for indirect emissions is the industry output multiplied by the 
tons of carbon embodied in the electricity used: 
 
(A51)    
As stated earlier, in our analysis the EITE allocation for an industry’s indirect carbon 
factor is 25 percent of the formula in the legislation (this derives from the fact that provisions in 
the law prevent these dual benefits to EITE industries). As a result the EITE allocation for 
indirect emissions is given by:  
 
(A52)      
 
 The value of the rebates is simply the allowance multiplied by the carbon price: 
 
(A53)     
 
and the subsidy rate for electricity use is: 
 
(A54)        
 
The total carbon price subsidy rate under this alternative policy is: 
 
(A55)     51 
Revenue Recycling 
In the general equilibrium calculations, the revenue from this new carbon tax is recycled 
back to the households as part of the assumption about government budget neutrality. In the 
short-run partial equilibrium framework, we also have to take this revenue into account to 
provide a complete estimate of the GDP and employment effects. First, define the total 
allowance revenue used for competitiveness allocations (i.e. for the EITE industries, electric 
utilities, and natural gas distribution companies) as:  
 
(A56)     
 
The total revenue the government receives under the carbon pricing policy, before any 
allocations, is given by: 
 
(A57)     
 
Subtracting the competitiveness allocations from the gross carbon revenue gives the total sum 
that is recycled to households: 
 
(A58)     
 
Household Income Effects 
In equation (A36) the change in sales of commodity j due to the higher price induced by 
the carbon tax is given by the demand elasticity,  . We assume that households reduce their 
purchases at the same rate, i.e. their demand curve follows the economy wide demand. The 
change in household expenditures on commodity j is the change in price plus the change in 
quantity. In the case of inelastic goods, this change in positive and leaves the household with 
less income to spend on other goods. We take this income effect into account in order to 
generate a complete accounting of the economy wide effects, even in the partial equilibrium 
framework.  
Let the percentage change in personal consumption expenditures on commodity j be 
given by: 
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Where   and   are the percentage changes in the price and quantity demanded of by 
households, respectively. The income effect due to the carbon tax,  , is the sum over all 
commodities: 
 
(A60)       
Since most of the elasticities are less than one (the reduction in quantities will be 
smaller than the increase in prices), the carbon tax will raise expenditures for most 
commodities, ignoring income effects. That is, we expect   to be positive, and this means 
that there is less total effective spending. 
A final effect on disposable income comes from the change in profits. The lower profits 
computed in (A42) means a reduction in short run incomes and this must also be accounted for. 
In (A58) we gave the expression for the revenue recycled to the households; the total net 
income effect is thus these transfers less the income effect  ( ), plus the total change in 
profits ( ):  
 
(A61)       
The change in profits is, however, endogenous since it depends on the level of output 
which depends on the income effect. To keep matters simple in this short-run, fixed coefficient, 
framework, we make an approximation of the iterative process that would make this change in 
profits consistent. 
A.3. Leakage 
This section summarizes the detailed discussion in Adkins et al. (2010). 
Industry Leakage 
In each region r, the output of industry t is equal to exports less imports plus domestic 
use: 
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The  change  in  output  due  to  policy  p  compared  to  the  no-policy  case  (denoted  by  a  0 
superscript) is thus the sum of the changes in domestic use, exports and (negative) imports: 
 
(A63a) 
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The  decomposition  of  this  output  change  is  given  in  Tables  13  and  14,  expressed  as  a 
percentage of base-case output. We define the trade impact as the share of output change offset 
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Emissions from industry t is the output multiplied by an emissions factor, 
, Qp
tr  . We first 
consider U.S. emissions. The change in U.S. emissions from industry t due to policy p may be 
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Substituting eq. (A63a) into this, we further decompose the change in U.S. emissions as the 
sum of the changes in the quantity of domestic use, the quantity of exports, the quantity of 
imports, and the carbon intensity of U.S. production: 
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We may further distinguish the trade effects by separating trade with Annex I and non-Annex I 
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We mark the terms in colors that are used in Figure 1. The last term (blue) represents the input 
substitution effect, the first term (purple) represents the reduction in consumption, the second 
term  (brown)  represents  the reduction  in  exports,  and  the  third  term  (green)  represents the 
increase in imports. 54 
  
Industry leakage is the extent to which the emissions reduction in industry  t in the 
United States is offset by emissions increases in the industry t in other regions. The increase in 
emissions in region r is due to changes in output levels and changes in input intensities. The 
changes in output levels, as noted in eq. (A63a), are due to changes in the region’s consumption 
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The  increase  in  emissions  from  industry  t  in  country  r  is  due  to  the  higher  domestic 
consumption, the higher net exports to the United States, the higher net exports to the non-U.S. 
countries (denoted by {nUS}), and the higher input intensities of that country’s industries. 
  
When discussing the leakage, EPA 2009b only considers the net exports to the United 
States, including the effect of the carbon intensity difference. In this paper, we compute only a 
parallel leakage for comparison; the complete set of factors described in eq. (A67) is given by 
Adkins et al. (2010). To compute the parallel leakage, we first rewrite (A67) to consider only 
trade with the United States, ignoring trade between r and the other regions: 
 













t r tr tr
Q p p p
t r trs trs tsr tsr
s US s US
Q p p p
t r trs trs tsr tsr
s nUS s nUS
Q p Q
tr tr tr
p t r US I UD UD
X X X X









   






Breaking the trade term up into changes in the level of trade and changes in the carbon 
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With  this  division,  the  leakage  in  industry  t  due  to  intensity  (or  production  technique) 
differences, summing for all regions, is: 
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In Figure 2, the quantity-of-trade effect is marked with blue bars, and this intensity difference is 
marked in brown shading. The ―trade-related leakage rate‖ is this sum divided by the total 
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This leakage rate is given in Table 16.  
 
Global Leakage 
We now look at the total change in emissions by region due to changes in industry and 
household behavior. From eq. (A64) above, the change in industrial emissions from r (denoted 
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The change in U.S. emissions is the sum of three terms: output  level, input substitution, and 
household consumption: 
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The total leakage is the sum of the changes over all the non-policy regions: 
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The  second  equality  breaks  the  total  industry  contribut ion  to  a  sum  of  the  output  effect  and 
input-substitution effect. The output effect for total industry leakage is the sum for all regions: 
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Similarly, the input substitution effect is: 
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The three terms on the right side of (A67) and (A68) are given in Table 17. 
 















When considering Annex-I multilateral policy, the formulas above are simply rewritten with 
―US‖ replaced by summing over Annex I regions; ―non-policy‖ then refers to a summation 
over the non-Annex I regions. 
Appendix B: Data Sources and Construction 
To obtain accurate estimates of the industry-specific burdens of a carbon-pricing policy, 
we calculate the carbon intensity of each industry, including carbon dioxide (CO2) from direct 
combustion, the use of electricity, and the relevant process emissions. Two types of information 
are required in this case: input–output (I-O) tables on the inter-industry flows and industry-
specific estimates of the physical quantities of the different fuels consumed. Unfortunately, not 
all the available value and energy data are designed to complement each other. While the 
industry data are collected in terms of the North American Industry Classification System 57 
(NAICS), only the energy data for manufacturing are collected on the NAICS basis. Energy 
data for transportation and services are collected on an end-use basis. A few exceptions to this 
rule exist, including coal use by the electric utilities industry, but for the most part, accurate 
energy consumption data by NAICS industry only exist for manufacturing industries. Thus, a 
key challenge is to develop a consistent set of fuel use estimates across all sectors. In this 
appendix we describe how we estimate the outputs and inputs, including energy inputs, for the 
52 industries identified in our study from these primary data. We note the various weaknesses 
in the data, including inconsistencies between the different sources, which we hope the research 
community and government agencies may help resolve. 
B.1. Constructing a 52-Sector Input–Output Matrix 
The main data for our analysis are from the 2006 annual input–output make and use 
tables for the U.S. from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS) (EIA 2006b). 
Our analysis focuses on 52 industries that have significant detail. Many manufacturing 
industries are six-digit NAICS industries, and non-manufacturing industries are less than six 
digits. Data availability drove the choice of industries, as did our focus on the impact of carbon-
pricing policies on energy-intensive manufacturing industries.  
The 2006 I-O table gives data for 65 primarily of three-digit NAICS industries. As a 
result, we first aggregated the raw 65-industry table to match the broad two- and three-digit 
NAICS industries. The BEA provides data for the government sector by including federal and 
state electric utilities. Since our modeling approach has electric utilities including government 
utilities, we disaggregate the initial government-sector entries in such a way that the resulting 
disaggregated industry output for government utilities (from the use table) matches the 2006 
industry output of federal and state electric utilities as found in detailed industry output tables 
available from the BEA. For the disaggregation of federal and state electric utilities in the make 
table, we assume based on the 2002 benchmark table that federal and state electric utilities only 
produce an electricity commodity and no other outputs. After disaggregating the federal and 
state electric utilities from the broad government sector in the 2006 table, we aggregated these 
within the private electric utilities industry in each of the use and make tables. 
After the reallocation of government electric utilities, it was necessary to disaggregate 
many of the manufacturing (and mining) industries to match our level of detail found in the 52 
industries. For example, the 2006 data at this point still contained data on inter-industry 
transactions at the level of chemicals, whereas our 52 industries is at the level of 
petrochemicals, fertilizers, etc. To disaggregate the 2006 data, we made used of the inter-
industry relationships found in the 2002 benchmark I-O tables. Specifically, in breaking apart 58 
the chemicals industry in the 2006 table, we assume that the shares of the inter-industry 
transactions in the 2002 table for the disaggregated chemicals industries are constant. If, for 
instance, 20 percent of the use of industry i’s output to chemicals is used by the petrochemicals 
industry, then we assume that in 2006, that amount of industry i’s output to petrochemicals 
shares the same relationship to the grand chemicals industry as it did in 2002.
23 Once the use 
and make matrices were at the level of 50 of our 52 industries, we removed the diagonal of the 
use matrix and subtracted this amount from the diagonal of the make matrix. We did this 
calculation because we assume that industry’s use of its own output is primarily the purchase of 
services within the same industry rather than real output. 
B.2 Energy Use 
We estimate CO2 emissions for 52 industrial sectors using quantities of fuel combusted. 
We consider seven types of energy sources: coal, crude oil, natural gas from gas mining, 
natural gas from gas utilities, liquefied petroleum gas (lpg) from the refining industry, other 
refined petroleum products, and electricity. The quantities of these energies for the 
manufacturing sector are from the MECS and EIA’s (2006a) Annual Energy Review (AER). 
For non-manufacturing industries, the quantities of the different fuels consumed are inferred 
based on a nationwide non-manufacturing average consumption price for each fuel that is 
computed given domestic industry consumption totals and the MECS data for manufacturing 
industries, along with the dollar value use of fuels by non-manufacturing industries. Each fuel’s 
industry-level consumption, after all fuel consumption updates, is consistent with national 
totals available from the EIA. 
In the following subsections, we discuss the MECS data as well as the development of 
price and quantity data of our seven energy sources. One common way of estimating the 
quantity of energy use at this level of aggregation is to assume that every purchaser pays the 
same economy average price and then apply that to the values in the I-O table. As we noted 
earlier in Morgenstern et. al. (2004), this is a poor assumption for some industries. For 
example, aluminum smelting pays a much lower average price for electricity than other 
industries. We thus turn to independent measures of energy use quantities to compare with the 
estimates derived from I-O dollar values. 
                                                 
23 Note that we disaggregated oil and gas mining, as well as the petroleum and coal products industry, using 
earlier data the BEA produced that had this disaggregation. 59 
B.2.1 Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey 
The MECS is the federal government’s most comprehensive source of information on 
energy use by U.S. manufacturing industries. The survey collects data on energy consumption 
and expenditures, fuel-switching capability, on-site generation of electricity, by-product energy 
use, and other energy-related topics. The manufacturing sector is defined according to the 
NAICS. The manufacturing sector (NAICS Sector 31–33) consists of all manufacturing 
establishments in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Our analysis is based on 2006 
data. 
The MECS reports the quantities of coal, coke and breeze, residual fuel oil, distillate 
fuel oil, natural gas, LPG and natural gas liquids, and net electricity for the manufacturing 
industries at the six-digit NAICS level. Of specific interest are Table 1.1. Consumption of 
Energy for All Purposes (First Use); Table 2.1 Energy Used as a Nonfuel (Feedstock); and 
Table 3.1 Energy Consumption as a Fuel. Some energy quantity data are either too small (*) or 
withheld (W, Q). We treat the small numbers as zeros. For data that were withheld, we do the 
best we can to reasonably estimate the consumption value based on total energy use and fuel-
use constraints across industries and within a given industry respectively. The details are given 
for specific fuel uses below. We also adopt other methods to estimate missing values, including 
energy balance. 
The industries found in the MECS tables vary some year-to-year, but they primarily are 
six-digit NAICS industries (with some broader industries when that level of detail is not 
available). In addition to providing fuel use by industry, the data were our source of feedstock 
ratios for manufacturing industries. However, before we could use the data, we had to resolve 
several issues. First, because they are not required to disclose information that could be used to 
infer the energy use of a particular firm or small group of firms, the EIA has suppressed the use 
of a particular fuel at the six-digit industry level in some instances in the raw data. Second, 
some uses of energy found in the MECS tables actually double-count certain fuel consumption, 
when that fuel is produced on site.  
We took several steps to infer the suppressed values in the original tables. The first step 
was to impute any suppressed values in MECS’s all-purpose energy consumption tables, Table 
1.1 and 1.2. Note that in this process, we used the tables corresponding to fuel use measured in 
BTUs (as opposed to physical units). These are the MECS tables ending in .2. To prevent the 
data user from simply obtaining suppressed information by means of subtracting the sums in 
the table from the energy use totals, many of rows with a suppressed value have more than one 
suppressed value. As a result, we formed an initial guess based on the ratio of total energy 
consumption for each industry to the total energy consumption across all industries. For an 60 
instance where industry i’s use of fuel f was suppressed, we multiplied the ratio for this 
industry by the total use of fuel f across all industries. Once an initial guess was made, we 
scaled each initial guess up (or down, depending on the case) until the total energy use for 
industry i (obtained by summing over each of the fuels) was equal to the reported total energy 
consumption across all fuels for this same industry.  
In MECS Table 2.2 (feedstock use of energy by industry), many of the suppressed 
values were the total feedstock energy consumption. When possible, we used the ratio of 2002 
total feedstock energy use to total all-purpose energy use, by industry, to estimate this 
suppressed total. In instances where it was not possible to use this ratio (due to an * for the 
2002 feedstock energy consumption), we simply took the total all-purpose energy consumption 
total (Table 1.2) and subtracted the total non-feedstock use of fuel from MECS Table 3.2. After 
we estimated the total, we were able to estimate the suppressed feedstock consumption, for a 
given industry, by taking the estimated total and subtracting the known energy consumption 
values for other fuels, for a given industry. Note that this last step was possible because the 
suppression (aside from * suppression) in Table 2.2 was for, at most, one fuel for a given 
industry. In Table 3.2, we employed the same approach for estimating suppressed values as in 
Table 1.2. 
The second issue with the MECS data is the double-counting of some energy uses from 
production on-site. To convey the general approach taken to correct for this issue, we will 
consider the case of iron and steel mills. Table B2 has the initial MECS values for energy 
consumption for the iron and steel mills industry as well as the steps taken to arrive at the 
energy consumption numbers included in our study. The * denotes values that are less than 0.5 
million. In our study, we assume these are 0 and replace them as such. The last column contains 
the amount of shipments on energy produced on-site. For the iron and steel industry, one easily 
can see that the total amount of all-purpose coke and breeze consumption (from Table 1.2) does 
not equal the total as found by adding up the feedstock use (from Table 2.2) and the non-
feedstock use (from Table 3.2). The later is larger, and as a result, we assume that the 
overcounting is due to processing of coal in coke. We first exclude consumption of coal for 
feedstock use. We also aggregated the use of ―other‖ fuel into the industry’s use of coal. As a 
result, after removing the initial coal feedstock, we replaced it with the feedstock use of other 
fuels and updated the total all-purpose coal use to reflect these changes. The next step was to 
aggregate the other non-feedstock energy consumption into the coal consumption column. We 
did this residually, such that the total all-purpose coal consumption (after the coal and other 
fuel aggregation) equals the sum of feedstock and non-feedstock coal use (again after the 
aggregation of coal and other fuel use). In the last step, we removed the overcounting in the use 
of coke by replacing the non-feedstock use of coke and breeze with the residual of total all-61 
purpose use and feedstock use. These steps and the resulting values derived from the original 
table are found in Table B2. 
B.2.2 Feedstock Ratios 
Feedstock ratios were obtained using the MECS data found in Tables 1.2 and 2.2. The 
MECS data allowed us to obtain the feedstock ratios for the use of coal, refined products, and 
natural gas. We calculated the feedstock ratio for the refining industry to be 93.7 percent, based 
on a report released by the EIA (Schipper 2006) and EIA (2009c) data on barrels of oils that 
were used at inputs to refineries in 2006. We computed the feedstock ratio by converting the 
2002 emissions from petroleum refining into an equivalent number of barrels and then dividing 
by barrels of oil input for all uses to the petroleum industry in 2006. The initial calculation of 
national emissions from these fuel consumption numbers and feedstock ratios was slightly 
larger than the number provided by the EIA for 2006—probably because we only developed 
feedstock ratios for manufacturing industries. In addition, the industry we refer to as refining-
other in our paper produces waxes, oil, and asphalt in addition to refined fuel products; 
importantly, these latter products are not combusted. As a result, we apply a common feedstock 
ratio across the board for non-manufacturing industries’ use of the refining-other industry’s 
output. The level of this feedstock ratio is 20.6 percent and is set such that the national 
emissions calculation from the fuel consumption data exactly matches the EPA-provided 
national emissions.  
B.2.3 Process Emissions 
Process emissions play a significant role in estimating the effects of a carbon-pricing 
policy for a select few industries. We updated the emissions derived from the underlying I-O 
accounts used in the very-short-run and short-run analyses, along with the modeling 
approaches, to include process emissions for the cement, lime and gypsum, and natural gas 
distribution industries. Data on process emissions come from EIA (2009b). We obtained 
process emissions from Table 15 of the report’s section on CO2 emissions. For 2008, total U.S. 
process emissions were 104 million metric tons, with cement contributing 42 percent, natural 
gas contributing 30 percent, and limestone consumption contributing 19 percent. The 
computation of our industries’ emissions intensities included process emissions. For a 
comparison of the relative importance of process emissions for the three industries mentioned, 
see Table 3, which contains direct, indirect, and process emissions for each of our 52 industries.  
B.3 CO2 Emissions and Intensity 
With energy use and feedstock use of each energy source by industry, we are able to 
calculate the total emissions from direct combustion and indirect energy consumption in 2006. 62 
This information allows us to compute CO2 emissions per million dollars of fuel consumption 
for each individual fuel. Table 3 shows total CO2 emissions intensity by industry. Energy 
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Figure 2. Industry Leakage Due to Trade with the U.S. (Multilateral 






















Food 1.36 1.70 3.06 75.10 11.04
Textile 4.13 2.51 6.64 70.96 39.32
Apparel 0.75 0.33 1.08 43.32 86.97
Wood & Furniture 2.10 2.57 4.72 58.06 28.26
Pulp Mills 3.97 7.81 11.78 68.80 51.48
Paper Mills 5.87 5.31 11.18 61.18 23.20
Paperboard Mills 8.85 8.81 17.66 66.61 0.60
Other Papers 1.54 1.09 2.63 61.58 6.22
Refining-LPG 0.78 9.28 69.02 84.97 0.00
Refining-Other 0.78 9.29 69.06 84.95 13.95
Petrochemical Manufacturing 0.83 16.99 21.31 72.45 10.27
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 8.75 2.97 12.37 66.91 24.14
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 2.68 12.19 19.45 83.27 25.49
Plastics and Material Resins 2.33 7.19 25.99 83.74 19.24
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments 5.81 4.98 12.14 81.17 13.14
Fertilizers 3.22 23.64 26.96 82.07 32.09
Other Chemical & Plastics 2.44 1.93 5.55 53.89 31.45
Glass Containers 8.06 12.32 20.39 55.20 18.16
Cement 10.97 14.12 25.09 52.05 13.92
Lime and Gypsum 3.35 14.33 17.68 59.57 1.60
Mineral Wool 5.96 5.99 11.95 56.90 7.88
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 2.07 4.03 6.27 56.70 19.90
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 5.76 5.30 11.50 63.92 24.53
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 18.17 5.58 25.11 66.33 52.91
Ferrous Metal Foundries 5.77 3.39 9.33 51.04 6.10
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 3.41 3.64 7.05 66.04 0.00
Other Primary Metals 3.78 1.96 6.94 66.50 56.69
Fabricated Metals 1.39 0.96 2.36 54.99 16.87
Machinery 1.04 0.33 1.37 58.01 43.69
Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.90 0.23 1.20 50.65 64.37
Motor Vehicles 1.08 0.59 1.68 71.03 53.70
Other Transportation Equipment 0.87 0.46 1.33 50.39 32.13
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.62 0.17 0.79 50.39 45.09
Farms 1.49 4.05 6.52 55.42 10.13
Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.20 1.22 1.74 23.76 25.56
Oil Mining 0.31 0.69 1.14 25.68 75.18
Gas Mining 0.31 0.69 1.14 25.68 20.33
Coal Mining 0.47 4.62 6.12 46.82 3.14
Other Mining Activities 0.50 5.62 7.38 44.60 0.47
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 0.00 17.27 17.65 32.86 1.09
Gas Utilities 0.08 0.10 48.89 71.12 0.00
Construction 0.18 1.74 2.36 47.33 0.00
Trade 0.78 0.70 1.65 37.32 -1.15
Air Transportation 0.09 16.87 21.34 57.23 20.57
Truck Transportation 0.68 7.99 10.72 47.17 1.30
Other Transportation 0.09 5.16 6.31 35.72 -3.75
Information 0.34 0.29 0.68 45.74 1.20
Finance and Insurance 0.27 0.09 0.38 21.70 3.21
Real Estate and Rental 2.00 0.33 2.40 31.29 0.01
Business Services 0.58 0.71 1.44 25.74 0.71
Other Services 0.86 0.48 1.42 39.59 0.10
Govt exc. Electricity 0.77 3.39 4.82 37.80 0.00
















































































Food 580.9 8.2 0.0 0.0 27.7 659.6 82 199
Textile 57.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.8 107.9 25 445
Apparel 29.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 7.8 2 59
Wood & Furniture 159.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 44.2 100.8 36 293
Pulp Mills 4.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 12.6 2 807
Paper Mills 51.4 6.6 0.0 0.0 8.3 176.9 32 875
Paperboard Mills 23.2 3.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 138.0 22 1,277
Other Papers 179.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 170.7 30 160
Refining-LPG 27.1 0.1 26.5 20.4 0.0 46.6 2 762
Refining-Other 452.0 2.5 442.9 341.4 0.0 778.5 38 763
Petrochemical Manufacturing 52.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 96.5 106.9 5 903
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 25.7 1.1 0.9 0.0 5.2 54.4 24 872
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 74.7 2.6 1.9 0.0 71.0 297.4 21 866
Plastics and Material Resins 76.5 0.5 0.5 1.7 22.9 323.6 19 543
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments 8.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 3.1 35.2 5 837
Fertilizers 11.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 302.9 4 1,742
Other Chemical & Plastics 483.1 3.8 0.0 1.7 15.1 538.1 127 254
Glass Containers 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 48.6 4 1,124
Cement 10.3 11.7 0.0 0.0 14.0 19.4 12 3,600
Lime and Gypsum 8.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 78.7 3 1,799
Mineral Wool 6.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.0 4 774
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 89.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 9.0 266.3 20 349
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 83.3 22.7 0.0 0.0 3.6 316.8 51 1,220
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 22.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 121.5 45 1,702
Ferrous Metal Foundries 20.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 3.8 34.0 12 717
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.6 5 435
Other Primary Metals 46.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.6 67.1 19 380
Fabricated Metals 280.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 233.0 42 144
Machinery 290.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 81.6 33 90
Computer & Electrical Equipment 418.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 84.3 40 65
Motor Vehicles 350.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.2 172.8 41 121
Other Transportation Equipment 175.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 69.2 16 82
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 144.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 15.2 10 48
Farms 220.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 126.4 51.5 37 353
Forestry, Fishing, etc 39.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 1.4 1 80
Oil Mining 89.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 6.8 8.1 3 72
Gas Mining 122.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 9.3 11.1 4 72
Coal Mining 26.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.2 26.6 1 313
Other Mining Activities 158.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 110.8 175.9 8 421
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 372.3 1,026.6 0.0 0.0 71.4 6,231.2 0 6,346
Gas Utilities 115.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 1 10
Construction 1,245.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 310.5 33.4 24 112
Trade 2,432.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 193.5 109.6 176 76
Air Transportation 144.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 342.9 0.5 1 947
Truck Transportation 234.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 268.4 23.8 17 507
Other Transportation 399.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 232.3 858.5 4 355
Information 1,013.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.6 100.3 36 34
Finance and Insurance 1,366.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.8 31.8 39 21
Real Estate and Rental 2,301.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 73.5 161.2 450 126
Business Services 2,142.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 192.7 152.5 132 75
Other Services 3,014.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 127.2 637.3 273 82
Govt exc. Electricity 2,608.7 1.2 0.0 0.0 809.6 2,867.4 218 235























































Total CO2 emissions (thousand metric tons) from:
Fossil fuel 
consumption
Electricity consumption Process emissions
Food 62,952.4 52,575.4 0.0 198.9
Textile 10,320.7 15,052.4 0.0 444.7
Apparel 476.9 1,241.3 0.0 58.9
Wood & Furniture 24,845.9 21,890.0 0.0 293.1
Pulp Mills 2,253.3 1,093.8 0.0 807.2
Paper Mills 25,813.1 19,102.9 0.0 874.6
Paperboard Mills 16,732.8 12,912.7 0.0 1,277.4
Other Papers 10,047.4 18,716.1 0.0 160.4
Refining-LPG 19,201.0 1,429.1 0.0 762.3
Refining-Other 320,879.1 23,883.2 0.0 762.8
Petrochemical Manufacturing 44,371.2 3,109.1 0.0 902.5
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 7,572.2 14,806.6 0.0 871.5
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 50,340.1 14,345.6 0.0 865.9
Plastics and Material Resins 28,454.9 13,118.8 0.0 543.5
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments 4,078.5 3,041.5 0.0 836.7
Fertilizers 16,854.7 2,411.7 0.0 1,742.0
Other Chemical & Plastics 43,185.8 79,324.5 0.0 253.6
Glass Containers 2,705.8 2,237.9 0.0 1,124.5
Cement 29,309.7 7,788.1 46,700.0 3,599.5
Lime and Gypsum 13,913.6 2,184.7 16,500.0 1,799.2
Mineral Wool 2,144.1 2,832.2 0.0 774.0
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 18,800.7 12,471.8 0.0 349.2
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 62,887.6 38,809.8 0.0 1,220.4
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 6,850.8 32,167.1 0.0 1,702.4
Ferrous Metal Foundries 5,445.6 8,927.9 0.0 717.1
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 2,112.5 3,331.9 0.0 434.5
Other Primary Metals 5,050.5 12,542.8 0.0 379.7
Fabricated Metals 13,275.4 27,117.9 0.0 144.3
Machinery 4,910.1 21,337.4 0.0 90.4
Computer & Electrical Equipment 4,800.5 22,203.6 0.0 64.5
Motor Vehicles 11,049.9 31,497.0 0.0 121.4
Other Transportation Equipment 4,422.3 9,974.2 0.0 82.2
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1,306.9 5,602.2 0.0 47.8
Farms 53,599.2 24,050.0 0.0 352.7
Forestry, Fishing, etc 2,769.4 422.1 0.0 80.2
Oil Mining 4,411.9 2,013.2 0.0 71.5
Gas Mining 6,015.3 2,744.8 0.0 71.5
Coal Mining 7,086.9 1,092.1 0.0 313.0
Other Mining Activities 61,185.8 5,589.9 0.0 421.4
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 2,362,712.2 0.0 0.0 6,346.4
Gas Utilities 609.3 567.9 26,600.0 10.2
Construction 125,084.7 14,343.9 0.0 112.0
Trade 83,082.1 102,921.3 0.0 76.5
Air Transportation 136,143.8 784.1 0.0 947.0
Truck Transportation 107,835.8 11,220.5 0.0 507.0
Other Transportation 139,444.1 2,275.7 0.0 354.6
Information 15,241.8 19,653.2 0.0 34.4
Finance and Insurance 6,835.0 21,952.7 0.0 21.1
Real Estate and Rental 38,506.1 250,394.6 0.0 125.5
Business Services 85,300.2 76,420.6 0.0 75.5
Other Services 85,500.2 162,546.1 0.0 82.3
Govt exc. Electricity 480,472.4 132,616.8 0.0 235.0





















































Total CO2 intensity 
(metric tons CO2 per 




EITE Allocations for direct carbon factor (53% of emissions from NG) + 25% of indirect carbon factor
Amount (mil $)
Subsidy rate (% of 
Output)
Qualifying share of 
industry output
Food 8.9 0.002% 1.4%
Textile 3.5 0.01% 1.6%
Apparel 0.0 - 0.0%
Wood & Furniture 16.9 0.01% 4.1%
Pulp Mills 33.2 0.80% 100.0%
Paper Mills 396.7 0.77% 100.0%
Paperboard Mills 0.0 - 0.0%
Other Papers 0.0 - 0.0%
Refining-LPG 114.1 0.42% 100.0%
Refining-Other 1,905.8 0.42% 100.0%
Petrochemical Manufacturing 648.2 1.23% 100.0%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 167.5 0.65% 100.0%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 778.8 1.04% 100.0%
Plastics and Material Resins 0.0 - 0.0%
Artificial and Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 71.6 0.84% 100.0%
Fertilizers 63.7 0.58% 32.4%
Other Chemical & Plastics 87.8 0.02% 12.4%
Glass Containers 32.6 0.74% 100.0%
Cement 460.3 4.47% 100.0%
Lime and Gypsum 35.8 0.40% 18.5%
Mineral Wool 29.5 0.46% 100.0%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 44.3 0.05% 18.9%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 942.8 1.13% 100.0%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 168.0 0.73% 100.0%
Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.0 - 0.0%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.0 - 0.0%
Other Primary Metals 18.5 0.04% 20.3%
Fabricated Metals 0.0 - 0.0%
Machinery 0.0 - 0.0%
Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.0 - 0.0%
Motor Vehicles 0.0 - 0.0%
Other Transportation Equipment 0.0 - 0.0%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.0 - 0.0%
Allocations for electric and gas utilities
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 26,933.0 7.23% -






























Subsidy for medium/long-run model based on Table 3
Amount (mil $) Industry output (mil $) Subsidy rate (% of output)
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 8.9 580,921.1 0.00%
     - Food
Textiles 3.5 57,061.5 0.01%
     - Textile
Wearing Apparel and Leather  0.0 29,184.2 -
     - Apparel
Wood 16.9 159,431.8 0.01%
     - Wood and furniture
Paper and Publishing 430.0 258,038.3 0.17%
     - Pulp mills
     - Paper mills
     - Paperboard mills
     - Other papers
Petroleum and Coal Products 2,019.9 479,059.3 0.42%
     - Refining-lpg
     - Refining-other
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 1,817.7 732,146.7 0.25%
     - Petrochemical manufacturing
     - Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg
     - Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg
     - Plastics and Material Resins
     - Artificial and Synthetic Fibers and Filaments
     - Fertilizers
     - Other Chemical & Plastics
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 602.5 119,622.8 0.50%
      - Glass containers
      - Cement
      - Lime and Gypsum
      - Mineral Wool
      - Other Nonmetallic Mineral
Ferrous Metals 942.8 103,377.7 0.91%
     - Ferrous Metal Foundries
Nonferrous primary metals 186.5 81,780.0 0.23%
     - Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries
Fabricated Metal Products 0.0 280,007.7 -
     - Fabricated Metals
Machinery 0.0 290,442.3 -
     - Machinery
Electronic equipment 0.0 418,529.3 -
     - Computer & Electrical Equipment
Transportation Equipment 0.0 525,825.5 -
     - Motor Vehicles
     - Other Transportation Equipment
Other Manufacturing 0.0 144,487.6 -
      - Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Electric Utilities 26,933.0 372,291.2 7.23%
Gas manuf. and distribution 8,079.8 115,350.4 7.00%
















Wood & Furniture 0.83% 0.59%
Pulp Mills 1.76% 0.38%
Paper Mills 1.89% 0.33%
Paperboard Mills 2.43% 1.30%
Other Papers 0.94% 0.61%
Refining-LPG 22.39% 21.75%
Refining-Other 9.84% 9.21%
Petrochemical Manufacturing 2.51% 0.89%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 1.65% 0.32%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 3.52% 1.91%
Plastics and Material Resins 2.56% 1.86%
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments 2.32% 0.83%
Fertilizers 2.95% 0.93%
Other Chemical & Plastics 1.11% 0.74%
Glass Containers 2.18% 0.06%
Cement 5.65% 0.22%
Lime and Gypsum 3.35% 2.04%
Mineral Wool 1.65% 0.33%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 1.81% 1.05%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 2.21% 0.35%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 2.39% 0.01%
Ferrous Metal Foundries 1.39% 0.73%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 1.32% 0.68%
Other Primary Metals 1.24% 0.57%
Fabricated Metals 0.85% 0.48%
Machinery 0.60% 0.42%
Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.40% 0.30%
Motor Vehicles 0.73% 0.54%
Other Transportation Equipment 0.49% 0.36%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.51% 0.42%
Farms 0.94% 0.77%
Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.33% 0.30%
Oil Mining 16.39% 16.33%
Gas Mining 9.10% 9.04%
Coal Mining 132.41% 132.34%
Other Mining Activities 0.94% 0.82%
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 9.03% 1.79%
Gas Utilities 8.93% 1.92%
Construction 0.54% 0.50%
Trade 0.25% 0.19%
Air Transportation 1.78% 1.70%
Truck Transportation 1.02% 0.93%
Other Transportation 0.63% 0.60%
Information 0.24% 0.20%
Finance and Insurance 0.11% 0.09%
Real Estate and Rental 0.30% 0.16%
Business Services 0.24% 0.19%
Other Services 0.31% 0.24%
Govt exc. Electricity 0.57% 0.46%
Table 5.  Very-Short-Run Effect of $15/ton CO2 Tax on Industry Prices (% 




























































Food 0.81% 0.20% 0.12% 0.49%
Textile 1.75% 0.32% 0.36% 1.07%
Apparel 0.50% 0.03% 0.07% 0.40%
Wood & Furniture 0.83% 0.27% 0.18% 0.38%
Pulp Mills 1.76% 0.95% 0.35% 0.47%
Paper Mills 1.89% 0.86% 0.51% 0.51%
Paperboard Mills 2.43% 1.27% 0.77% 0.39%
Other Papers 0.94% 0.11% 0.13% 0.69%
Refining-LPG 1.40% 1.20% 0.07% 0.13%
Refining-Other 1.35% 1.15% 0.07% 0.13%
Petrochemical Manufacturing 2.51% 1.66% 0.07% 0.78%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 1.65% 0.41% 0.76% 0.48%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 3.52% 1.26% 0.23% 2.02%
Plastics and Material Resins 2.56% 0.72% 0.20% 1.64%
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments 2.32% 0.63% 0.51% 1.18%
Fertilizers 2.95% 2.26% 0.28% 0.41%
Other Chemical & Plastics 1.11% 0.21% 0.21% 0.69%
Glass Containers 2.18% 1.19% 0.71% 0.29%
Cement 5.65% 4.46% 0.95% 0.24%
Lime and Gypsum 3.35% 2.61% 0.29% 0.45%
Mineral Wool 1.65% 0.64% 0.52% 0.49%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 1.81% 0.40% 0.18% 1.23%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 2.21% 1.25% 0.50% 0.46%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 2.39% 0.53% 1.58% 0.28%
Ferrous Metal Foundries 1.39% 0.48% 0.50% 0.41%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 1.32% 0.35% 0.30% 0.67%
Other Primary Metals 1.24% 0.21% 0.33% 0.70%
Fabricated Metals 0.85% 0.09% 0.12% 0.64%
Machinery 0.60% 0.03% 0.09% 0.48%
Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.40% 0.02% 0.08% 0.30%
Motor Vehicles 0.73% 0.06% 0.09% 0.58%
Other Transportation Equipment 0.49% 0.05% 0.08% 0.37%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.51% 0.02% 0.05% 0.43%
Farms 0.94% 0.42% 0.14% 0.38%
Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.33% 0.12% 0.02% 0.20%
Oil Mining 0.31% 0.08% 0.03% 0.20%
Gas Mining 0.31% 0.08% 0.03% 0.20%
Coal Mining 0.69% 0.43% 0.04% 0.23%
Other Mining Activities 0.94% 0.61% 0.04% 0.29%
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 9.03% 8.95% 0.00% 0.08%
Gas Utilities 0.17% 0.01% 0.01% 0.15%
Construction 0.54% 0.17% 0.02% 0.35%
Trade 0.25% 0.06% 0.06% 0.13%
Air Transportation 1.78% 1.62% 0.01% 0.15%
Truck Transportation 1.02% 0.79% 0.06% 0.17%
Other Transportation 0.63% 0.49% 0.01% 0.13%
Information 0.24% 0.03% 0.03% 0.18%
Finance and Insurance 0.11% 0.01% 0.02% 0.08%
Real Estate and Rental 0.30% 0.03% 0.16% 0.12%
Business Services 0.24% 0.07% 0.05% 0.12%
Other Services 0.31% 0.05% 0.07% 0.19%
Govt exc. Electricity 0.57% 0.34% 0.07% 0.17%




























































Food 0.61% 0.11% 0.02% 0.48%
Textile 1.10% 0.18% 0.06% 0.85%
Apparel 0.42% 0.01% 0.01% 0.40%
Wood & Furniture 0.60% 0.22% 0.03% 0.35%
Pulp Mills 1.18% 0.70% 0.06% 0.42%
Paper Mills 1.11% 0.60% 0.09% 0.42%
Paperboard Mills 1.30% 0.81% 0.14% 0.35%
Other Papers 0.61% 0.04% 0.02% 0.55%
Refining-LPG 1.18% 1.05% 0.01% 0.12%
Refining-Other 1.14% 1.01% 0.01% 0.11%
Petrochemical Manufacturing 2.12% 1.50% 0.01% 0.62%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 0.98% 0.39% 0.14% 0.44%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 2.96% 1.16% 0.04% 1.75%
Plastics and Material Resins 1.86% 0.50% 0.04% 1.32%
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments 1.67% 0.58% 0.09% 1.00%
Fertilizers 1.51% 1.06% 0.05% 0.39%
Other Chemical & Plastics 0.76% 0.12% 0.04% 0.61%
Glass Containers 0.80% 0.39% 0.13% 0.28%
Cement 4.69% 4.28% 0.17% 0.24%
Lime and Gypsum 2.44% 1.94% 0.05% 0.44%
Mineral Wool 0.79% 0.24% 0.09% 0.45%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral 1.10% 0.18% 0.03% 0.89%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 1.48% 0.95% 0.09% 0.44%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 0.74% 0.20% 0.29% 0.26%
Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.73% 0.34% 0.09% 0.30%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.68% 0.10% 0.05% 0.53%
Other Primary Metals 0.61% 0.09% 0.06% 0.46%
Fabricated Metals 0.48% 0.03% 0.02% 0.42%
Machinery 0.42% 0.01% 0.02% 0.39%
Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.30% 0.01% 0.01% 0.28%
Motor Vehicles 0.54% 0.02% 0.02% 0.50%
Other Transportation Equipment 0.36% 0.02% 0.01% 0.33%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.42% 0.01% 0.01% 0.40%
Farms 0.77% 0.39% 0.02% 0.36%
Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.30% 0.11% 0.00% 0.18%
Oil Mining 0.25% 0.07% 0.00% 0.17%
Gas Mining 0.25% 0.07% 0.00% 0.17%
Coal Mining 0.62% 0.40% 0.01% 0.22%
Other Mining Activities 0.82% 0.58% 0.01% 0.24%
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 9.02% 8.95% 0.00% 0.08%
Gas Utilities 0.16% 0.01% 0.00% 0.15%
Construction 0.50% 0.16% 0.00% 0.33%
Trade 0.19% 0.05% 0.01% 0.13%
Air Transportation 1.70% 1.55% 0.00% 0.15%
Truck Transportation 0.93% 0.75% 0.01% 0.17%
Other Transportation 0.60% 0.47% 0.00% 0.12%
Information 0.20% 0.02% 0.01% 0.17%
Finance and Insurance 0.09% 0.01% 0.00% 0.08%
Real Estate and Rental 0.16% 0.02% 0.03% 0.11%
Business Services 0.19% 0.06% 0.01% 0.12%
Other Services 0.24% 0.04% 0.01% 0.19%
Govt exc. Electricity 0.46% 0.29% 0.01% 0.16%

























































Without H.R. 2454 
allocations
Multilateral
Without H.R. 2454 
allocations
Unilateral
With H.R. 2454 
allocations
Multilateral
With H.R. 2454 
allocations
Food 0.06% 0.13% -0.21% -0.17%
Textile -2.43% -1.36% -1.75% -1.12%
Apparel 1.79% 1.37% -0.15% -0.50%
Wood & Furniture -0.60% -0.34% -0.57% -0.40%
Pulp Mills -0.41% -0.04% -0.05% -0.06%
Paper Mills -0.61% -0.18% -0.06% -0.06%
Paperboard Mills -1.05% -0.42% -0.65% -0.35%
Other Papers -0.20% -0.01% -0.26% -0.15%
Refining-LPG -1.10% -1.22% -1.41% -1.50%
Refining-Other -0.28% -0.38% -0.54% -0.62%
Petrochemical Manufacturing -3.02% -0.74% -1.12% -0.37%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg -2.00% -0.49% -0.36% -0.12%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg -4.59% -1.31% -2.61% -0.85%
Plastics and Material Resins -3.20% -0.84% -2.53% -0.82%
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments -2.12% -0.18% -0.86% -0.30%
Fertilizers -3.75% -0.99% -1.20% -0.38%
Other Chemical & Plastics -1.05% -0.11% -0.91% -0.30%
Glass Containers -1.08% -0.32% 0.12% 0.04%
Cement -4.06% -1.82% -0.09% -0.05%
Lime and Gypsum -2.36% -1.04% -1.51% -0.71%
Mineral Wool -1.11% -0.46% -0.21% -0.09%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral -1.12% -0.27% -0.73% -0.18%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy -1.56% -0.28% -0.19% -0.06%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum -4.11% -1.41% 0.10% 0.02%
Ferrous Metal Foundries -0.97% -0.17% -0.58% -0.18%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries -2.21% -0.72% -1.21% -0.47%
Other Primary Metals -1.98% -0.61% -0.99% -0.38%
Fabricated Metals -0.33% -0.11% -0.26% -0.16%
Machinery -0.96% -0.41% -0.73% -0.35%
Computer & Electrical Equipment -0.79% -0.35% -0.73% -0.41%
Motor Vehicles -0.89% -0.19% -0.87% -0.36%
Other Transportation Equipment -0.79% -0.27% -0.62% -0.25%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing -0.83% -0.38% -0.98% -0.60%
Farms -0.22% 0.03% -0.45% -0.25%
Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.42% 0.39% -0.04% -0.06%
Oil Mining -0.42% -1.73% -1.42% -2.68%
Gas Mining -1.17% -2.45% -1.44% -2.69%
Coal Mining -25.42% -25.52% -25.70% -25.78%
Other Mining Activities -0.23% -0.06% -0.26% -0.11%
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) -4.26% -4.24% -0.81% -0.92%
Gas Utilities -4.30% -4.40% -0.90% -1.03%
Construction -0.34% -0.32% -0.34% -0.32%
Trade 0.28% 0.19% 0.02% -0.05%
Air Transportation -0.53% -0.28% -0.81% -0.56%
Truck Transportation -0.21% -0.09% -0.42% -0.30%
Other Transportation 0.03% 0.06% -0.23% -0.18%
Information 0.19% 0.13% 0.00% -0.05%
Finance and Insurance 0.39% 0.29% 0.08% 0.00%
Real Estate and Rental 0.26% 0.17% 0.02% -0.06%
Business Services 0.23% 0.15% -0.02% -0.08%
Other Services 0.37% 0.25% 0.00% -0.10%


























































Short-run           Short-run          
Food -8.47% 0.06% 0.13%
Textile -19.22% -2.43% -1.36%
Apparel -3.25% 1.79% 1.37%
Wood & Furniture -6.66% -0.60% -0.34%
Pulp Mills -16.39% -0.41% -0.04%
Paper Mills -9.01% -0.61% -0.18%
Paperboard Mills -14.89% -1.05% -0.42%
Other Papers -8.33% -0.20% -0.01%
Refining-LPG -17.58% -1.10% -1.22%
Refining-Other -11.81% -0.28% -0.38%
Petrochemical Manufacturing -14.62% -3.02% -0.74%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg -31.25% -2.00% -0.49%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg -84.32% -4.59% -1.31%
Plastics and Material Resins -33.97% -3.20% -0.84%
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments -64.75% -2.12% -0.18%
Fertilizers -76.28% -3.75% -0.99%
Other Chemical & Plastics -4.04% -1.05% -0.11%
Glass Containers -8.89% -1.08% -0.32%
Cement -17.05% -4.06% -1.82%
Lime and Gypsum -13.48% -2.36% -1.04%
Mineral Wool -6.84% -1.11% -0.46%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral -9.51% -1.12% -0.27%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy -12.81% -1.56% -0.28%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum -12.55% -4.11% -1.41%
Ferrous Metal Foundries -6.51% -0.97% -0.17%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries -16.24% -2.21% -0.72%
Other Primary Metals -7.29% -1.98% -0.61%
Fabricated Metals -5.35% -0.33% -0.11%
Machinery -4.51% -0.96% -0.41%
Computer & Electrical Equipment -5.78% -0.79% -0.35%
Motor Vehicles -15.91% -0.89% -0.19%
Other Transportation Equipment -3.25% -0.79% -0.27%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing -2.61% -0.83% -0.38%
Farms -2.60% -0.22% 0.03%
Forestry, Fishing, etc -1.19% 0.42% 0.39%
Oil Mining -0.53% -0.42% -1.73%
Gas Mining -0.53% -1.17% -2.45%
Coal Mining -2.33% -25.42% -25.52%
Other Mining Activities -2.77% -0.23% -0.06%
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) -22.38% -4.26% -4.24%
Gas Utilities -0.85% -4.30% -4.40%
Construction -2.92% -0.34% -0.32%
Trade -1.50% 0.28% 0.19%
Air Transportation -25.21% -0.53% -0.28%
Truck Transportation -4.98% -0.21% -0.09%
Other Transportation -3.26% 0.03% 0.06%
Information -0.86% 0.19% 0.13%
Finance and Insurance -0.34% 0.39% 0.29%
Real Estate and Rental -0.53% 0.26% 0.17%
Business Services -1.12% 0.23% 0.15%
Other Services -2.14% 0.37% 0.25%





















































Table 9. Very-Short-Run vs. Short-Run: Effect on Profits Due to a $15/ton CO2 Tax (Percent 





Short-run           Short-run          
Food -6.39% -0.21% -0.17%
Textile -11.94% -1.75% -1.12%
Apparel -2.72% -0.15% -0.50%
Wood & Furniture -4.75% -0.57% -0.40%
Pulp Mills -3.54% -0.05% -0.06%
Paper Mills -1.59% -0.06% -0.06%
Paperboard Mills -7.93% -0.65% -0.35%
Other Papers -5.40% -0.26% -0.15%
Refining-LPG -9.34% -1.41% -1.50%
Refining-Other -6.28% -0.54% -0.62%
Petrochemical Manufacturing -5.19% -1.12% -0.37%
Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg -6.11% -0.36% -0.12%
Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg -45.87% -2.61% -0.85%
Plastics and Material Resins -24.70% -2.53% -0.82%
Artificial & Synthetic Fibers, Filaments -23.20% -0.86% -0.30%
Fertilizers -24.11% -1.20% -0.38%
Other Chemical & Plastics -2.70% -0.91% -0.30%
Glass Containers -0.23% 0.12% 0.04%
Cement -0.66% -0.09% -0.05%
Lime and Gypsum -8.21% -1.51% -0.71%
Mineral Wool -1.36% -0.21% -0.09%
Other Nonmetallic Mineral -5.51% -0.73% -0.18%
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy -2.04% -0.19% -0.06%
Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum -0.05% 0.10% 0.02%
Ferrous Metal Foundries -3.42% -0.58% -0.18%
Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries -8.38% -1.21% -0.47%
Other Primary Metals -3.37% -0.99% -0.38%
Fabricated Metals -3.00% -0.26% -0.16%
Machinery -3.16% -0.73% -0.35%
Computer & Electrical Equipment -4.25% -0.73% -0.41%
Motor Vehicles -11.74% -0.87% -0.36%
Other Transportation Equipment -2.37% -0.62% -0.25%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing -2.18% -0.98% -0.60%
Farms -2.13% -0.45% -0.25%
Forestry, Fishing, etc -1.06% -0.04% -0.06%
Oil Mining -0.43% -1.42% -2.68%
Gas Mining -0.43% -1.44% -2.69%
Coal Mining -2.09% -25.70% -25.78%
Other Mining Activities -2.41% -0.26% -0.11%
Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) -4.43% -0.81% -0.92%
Gas Utilities 34.44% -0.90% -1.03%
Construction -2.70% -0.34% -0.32%
Trade -1.16% 0.02% -0.05%
Air Transportation -24.15% -0.81% -0.56%
Truck Transportation -4.54% -0.42% -0.30%
Other Transportation -3.11% -0.23% -0.18%
Information -0.72% 0.00% -0.05%
Finance and Insurance -0.27% 0.08% 0.00%
Real Estate and Rental -0.29% 0.02% -0.06%
Business Services -0.88% -0.02% -0.08%
Other Services -1.62% 0.00% -0.10%





















































Table 10. Very-Short-Run vs. Short-Run: Effect on Profits Due to a $15/ton CO2 Tax with 
Allocations for EITE Industries (percent change)77 
Table 11.  Effect on Output of a $15/ton CO2 Tax without H.R. 2454 Allocations (percentage change)

























Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.06 0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09
Textiles -2.43 -1.36 -0.41 -0.42 -0.51 -0.56
Wearing Apparel and Leather  1.79 1.37 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.03
Wood -0.60 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 -0.41 -0.48
Paper and Publishing -0.36 -0.08 -0.35 -0.24 -0.39 -0.30
Petroleum and Coal Products -0.33 -0.43 -6.26 -4.73 -7.28 -6.18
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics -1.87 -0.38 -1.86 -1.25 -2.38 -1.68
Non-Metallic Mineral Products -1.46 -0.47 -1.13 -1.00 -1.41 -1.23
Ferrous Metals -1.44 -0.26 -1.34 -1.00 -1.51 -1.11
Nonferrous primary metals -2.61 -0.85 -2.01 -1.44 -2.68 -1.92
Fabricated Metal Products -0.33 -0.11 -0.49 -0.51 -0.52 -0.56
Transportation Equipment -0.86 -0.22 -0.23 -0.25 -0.24 -0.30
Electronic equipment -0.79 -0.35 -0.35 -0.44 -0.27 -0.42
Machinery -0.96 -0.41 -0.27 -0.38 -0.17 -0.30
Other Manufacturing -0.83 -0.38 -0.07 -0.15 0.04 -0.18
Agriculture -0.22 0.03 -0.25 -0.18 -0.17 -0.14
Coal -25.42 -25.52 -10.02 -13.83 -13.70 -17.03
Oil mining -0.42 -1.73 -0.29 -0.39 -1.80 -2.50
Gas mining -1.17 -2.45 -0.63 -1.13 -2.33 -3.84
Other Minerals -0.23 -0.06 -0.96 -0.78 -1.23 -1.01
Electric Utilities -4.26 -4.24 -4.09 -3.64 -4.42 -4.13
Gas manuf. and distribution -4.30 -4.40 -6.94 -6.86 -9.16 -9.05
Construction -0.34 -0.32 -0.41 -0.40 -0.51 -0.51
Trade 0.28 0.19 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Transportation Services -0.15 -0.05 -1.63 -1.29 -1.78 -1.52
Communications 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15
Finance and Insurance 0.39 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05
Services (inc real estate) 0.29 0.20 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07
Owner-occupied Dwellings - - 0.03 0.03 0.50 0.51
Weighted average across all EITE
1: -1.02 -0.26 -0.89 -0.63 -1.10 -0.83
(w/o petroleum products)






















































Table 12.  Effect on Output of a $15/ton CO2 Tax with H.R. 2454 Allocations (percentage change)



























Food, Beverages, and Tobacco -0.21 -0.17 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11
Textiles -1.75 -1.12 -0.37 -0.38 -0.48 -0.53
Wearing Apparel and Leather  -0.15 -0.50 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12
Wood -0.57 -0.40 -0.31 -0.31 -0.42 -0.48
Paper and Publishing -0.25 -0.15 -0.16 -0.06 -0.16 -0.07
Petroleum and Coal Products -0.59 -0.67 -5.66 -4.12 -6.56 -5.45
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics -1.25 -0.41 -1.28 -0.66 -1.54 -0.83
Non-Metallic Mineral Products -0.67 -0.20 -0.60 -0.47 -0.68 -0.51
Ferrous Metals -0.27 -0.08 -0.17 0.17 0.02 0.43
Nonferrous primary metals -0.72 -0.28 -0.81 -0.23 -0.61 0.16
Fabricated Metal Products -0.26 -0.16 -0.36 -0.39 -0.36 -0.40
Transportation Equipment -0.79 -0.32 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26 -0.32
Electronic equipment -0.73 -0.41 -0.39 -0.49 -0.43 -0.58
Machinery -0.73 -0.35 -0.31 -0.43 -0.30 -0.43
Other Manufacturing -0.98 -0.60 -0.12 -0.21 -0.10 -0.32
Agriculture -0.45 -0.25 -0.29 -0.22 -0.30 -0.26
Coal -25.70 -25.78 -8.74 -12.27 -12.07 -15.20
Oil mining -1.42 -2.68 -0.26 -0.37 -1.74 -2.44
Gas mining -1.44 -2.69 -0.52 -1.02 -2.08 -3.59
Other Minerals -0.26 -0.11 -0.50 -0.33 -0.55 -0.33
Electric Utilities -0.81 -0.92 -0.92 -0.47 -0.18 0.13
Gas manuf. and distribution -0.90 -1.03 -3.65 -3.58 -4.86 -4.76
Construction -0.34 -0.32 -0.37 -0.36 -0.44 -0.45
Trade 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.02
Transportation Services -0.39 -0.29 -1.53 -1.19 -1.67 -1.40
Communications 0.00 -0.05 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09
Finance and Insurance 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05
Services (inc real estate) 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10
Owner-occupied Dwellings - - 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.35
Weighted average across all EITE
1: -0.68 -0.31 -0.54 -0.29 -0.62 -0.35
(w/o petroleum products)






















































Table 13a.  Medium-Run Trade Effects of a $15/ton CO2 Tax without H.R. 2454 Allocations
Unilateral Multilateral
Contribution (Q=U+X-M) Contribution (Q=U+X-M)
Use Exports Imports Use Exports Imports
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 684.7 -0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.04
Textiles 146.8 -0.41 -0.22 -0.11 0.08 -0.42 -0.20 -0.11 0.10
Wearing Apparel and Leather  159.5 0.00 0.17 -0.02 0.15 -0.03 0.20 -0.03 0.20
Wood 274.6 -0.33 -0.33 -0.01 -0.02 -0.33 -0.31 -0.02 0.00
Paper and Publishing 393.8 -0.35 -0.20 -0.10 0.06 -0.24 -0.13 -0.08 0.03
Petroleum and Coal Products 309.6 -6.26 -6.02 -0.40 -0.16 -4.73 -4.78 -0.31 -0.36
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 732.8 -1.86 -0.65 -0.86 0.36 -1.25 -0.49 -0.62 0.14
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 122.8 -1.13 -0.53 -0.27 0.33 -1.00 -0.50 -0.24 0.26
Ferrous Metals 149.6 -1.34 -0.62 -0.36 0.36 -1.00 -0.61 -0.22 0.17
Nonferrous primary metals 116.8 -2.01 -0.86 -0.73 0.42 -1.44 -0.74 -0.55 0.15
Fabricated Metal Products 303.0 -0.49 -0.43 -0.05 0.01 -0.51 -0.43 -0.06 0.02
Transportation Equipment 765.8 -0.23 -0.18 -0.06 -0.01 -0.25 -0.15 -0.09 0.01
Electronic equipment 560.9 -0.35 -0.30 -0.09 -0.04 -0.44 -0.32 -0.14 -0.02
Machinery 862.5 -0.27 -0.40 0.02 -0.12 -0.38 -0.40 -0.07 -0.09
Other Manufacturing 116.1 -0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.15 0.19 -0.11 0.23
Agriculture 245.5 -0.25 -0.11 -0.12 0.03 -0.18 -0.08 -0.08 0.02
Coal 38.9 -10.02 -19.43 8.40 -1.01 -13.83 -18.03 3.36 -0.83
Oil mining 202.5 -0.29 -5.12 0.01 -4.82 -0.39 -3.39 0.00 -3.00
Gas mining 36.3 -0.63 -8.18 2.50 -5.06 -1.13 -5.83 4.08 -0.62
Other Minerals 32.0 -0.96 -1.18 0.04 -0.18 -0.78 -0.93 -0.02 -0.16
Electric Utilities 300.6 -4.09 -3.98 -0.11 0.00 -3.64 -3.56 -0.08 0.00
Gas manuf. and distribution 86.4 -6.94 -6.97 0.03 0.00 -6.86 -6.86 0.00 0.00
Construction 1,389.9 -0.41 -0.41 0.00 0.00 -0.40 -0.40 0.00 0.00
Trade 2,419.5 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00
Transportation Services 788.7 -1.63 -0.90 -0.46 0.27 -1.29 -0.77 -0.34 0.17
Communications 436.8 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.16 -0.01 0.01
Finance and Insurance 1,728.3 0.09 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00
Services (inc real estate) 6,567.1 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00
































































Table 13b.  Long Run Trade Effects of a $15/ton CO2 Tax without H.R. 2454 Allocations
Unilateral Multilateral
Contribution (Q=U+X-M) Contribution (Q=U+X-M)
Use Exports Imports Use Exports Imports
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 684.7 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.03
Textiles 146.8 -0.43 -0.26 -0.11 0.07 -0.47 -0.26 -0.11 0.09
Wearing Apparel and Leather  159.5 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.12
Wood 274.6 -0.35 -0.42 0.00 -0.08 -0.40 -0.42 -0.01 -0.04
Paper and Publishing 393.8 -0.39 -0.25 -0.08 0.05 -0.29 -0.21 -0.07 0.02
Petroleum and Coal Products 309.6 -6.83 -6.55 -0.46 -0.18 -5.80 -5.89 -0.39 -0.47
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 732.8 -2.37 -0.83 -1.08 0.46 -1.67 -0.68 -0.81 0.18
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 122.8 -1.26 -0.62 -0.29 0.35 -1.11 -0.61 -0.25 0.25
Ferrous Metals 149.6 -1.36 -0.62 -0.37 0.37 -1.00 -0.62 -0.21 0.16
Nonferrous primary metals 116.8 -2.37 -0.93 -0.88 0.57 -1.70 -0.80 -0.71 0.19
Fabricated Metal Products 303.0 -0.50 -0.47 -0.04 -0.01 -0.53 -0.50 -0.04 -0.01
Transportation Equipment 765.8 -0.21 -0.27 -0.02 -0.08 -0.26 -0.27 -0.03 -0.04
Electronic equipment 560.9 -0.23 -0.30 -0.02 -0.10 -0.35 -0.35 -0.08 -0.09
Machinery 862.5 -0.16 -0.50 0.13 -0.21 -0.29 -0.52 0.05 -0.18
Other Manufacturing 116.1 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.15
Agriculture 245.5 -0.18 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 -0.15 -0.11 -0.03 0.01
Coal 38.9 -14.31 -20.83 5.61 -0.91 -17.79 -20.12 1.58 -0.75
Oil mining 202.5 -0.63 -5.68 0.01 -5.04 -0.87 -4.51 0.00 -3.63
Gas mining 36.3 -1.52 -8.76 1.86 -5.38 -2.51 -7.51 2.15 -2.85
Other Minerals 32.0 -1.20 -1.37 -0.01 -0.18 -0.98 -1.09 -0.07 -0.18
Electric Utilities 300.6 -4.43 -4.32 -0.12 0.00 -4.15 -4.06 -0.08 0.00
Gas manuf. and distribution 86.4 -9.17 -9.16 -0.01 0.00 -9.06 -9.05 -0.01 0.00
Construction 1,389.9 -0.51 -0.51 0.00 0.00 -0.51 -0.51 0.00 0.00
Trade 2,419.5 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Transportation Services 788.7 -1.75 -1.02 -0.47 0.26 -1.49 -0.95 -0.37 0.17
Communications 436.8 0.16 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.00
Finance and Insurance 1,728.3 0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01
Services (inc real estate) 6,567.1 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00
































































Table 14a.  Medium-Run Trade Effects of a $15/ton CO2 Tax with H.R. 2454 Allocations
Unilateral Multilateral
Contribution (Q=U+X-M) Contribution (Q=U+X-M)
Use Exports Imports Use Exports Imports
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 684.7 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.05
Textiles 146.8 -0.37 -0.18 -0.10 0.09 -0.38 -0.17 -0.11 0.11
Wearing Apparel and Leather  159.5 -0.06 0.20 -0.04 0.22 -0.08 0.23 -0.04 0.27
Wood 274.6 -0.31 -0.27 -0.02 0.01 -0.31 -0.25 -0.03 0.04
Paper and Publishing 393.8 -0.16 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.01
Petroleum and Coal Products 309.6 -5.66 -5.53 -0.33 -0.19 -4.12 -4.28 -0.24 -0.39
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 732.8 -1.28 -0.42 -0.61 0.26 -0.66 -0.25 -0.37 0.04
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 122.8 -0.60 -0.37 -0.12 0.11 -0.47 -0.34 -0.09 0.04
Ferrous Metals 149.6 -0.17 -0.36 0.06 -0.13 0.17 -0.34 0.20 -0.31
Nonferrous primary metals 116.8 -0.81 -0.48 -0.23 0.10 -0.23 -0.35 -0.05 -0.17
Fabricated Metal Products 303.0 -0.36 -0.34 -0.03 -0.01 -0.39 -0.35 -0.04 0.00
Transportation Equipment 765.8 -0.23 -0.12 -0.08 0.03 -0.26 -0.10 -0.11 0.05
Electronic equipment 560.9 -0.39 -0.29 -0.12 -0.02 -0.49 -0.31 -0.17 0.00
Machinery 862.5 -0.31 -0.31 -0.05 -0.05 -0.43 -0.31 -0.14 -0.02
Other Manufacturing 116.1 -0.12 0.20 -0.11 0.21 -0.21 0.26 -0.16 0.31
Agriculture 245.5 -0.29 -0.10 -0.15 0.04 -0.22 -0.07 -0.12 0.04
Coal 38.9 -8.74 -16.97 7.30 -0.93 -12.27 -15.54 2.54 -0.74
Oil mining 202.5 -0.26 -4.52 0.01 -4.25 -0.37 -2.78 0.00 -2.41
Gas mining 36.3 -0.52 -6.96 2.08 -4.36 -1.02 -4.55 3.69 0.16
Other Minerals 32.0 -0.50 -0.64 0.04 -0.11 -0.33 -0.39 -0.02 -0.08
Electric Utilities 300.6 -0.92 -0.89 -0.04 0.00 -0.47 -0.47 0.00 0.00
Gas manuf. and distribution 86.4 -3.65 -3.72 0.07 0.00 -3.58 -3.62 0.03 0.00
Construction 1,389.9 -0.37 -0.37 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.36 0.00 0.00
Trade 2,419.5 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.00
Transportation Services 788.7 -1.53 -0.75 -0.49 0.30 -1.19 -0.62 -0.37 0.20
Communications 436.8 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.15 -0.02 0.01
Finance and Insurance 1,728.3 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.01
Services (inc real estate) 6,567.1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.01
Owner-occupied Dwellings 1,187.8 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00































































Table 14b.  Long Run Trade Effects of a $15/ton CO2 Tax with H.R. 2454 Allocations
Unilateral Multilateral
Contribution (Q=U+X-M) Contribution (Q=U+X-M)
Use Exports Imports Use Exports Imports
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 684.7 -0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.05 0.05
Textiles 146.8 -0.40 -0.22 -0.11 0.08 -0.44 -0.22 -0.11 0.11
Wearing Apparel and Leather  159.5 -0.03 0.18 -0.03 0.18 -0.07 0.19 -0.03 0.22
Wood 274.6 -0.35 -0.34 -0.02 -0.01 -0.40 -0.34 -0.03 0.03
Paper and Publishing 393.8 -0.16 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02
Petroleum and Coal Products 309.6 -6.15 -5.98 -0.38 -0.21 -5.12 -5.31 -0.31 -0.51
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 732.8 -1.53 -0.52 -0.71 0.31 -0.83 -0.37 -0.43 0.03
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 122.8 -0.61 -0.43 -0.10 0.08 -0.45 -0.42 -0.06 -0.02
Ferrous Metals 149.6 0.01 -0.33 0.13 -0.22 0.38 -0.33 0.29 -0.42
Nonferrous primary metals 116.8 -0.54 -0.39 -0.11 0.03 0.15 -0.25 0.07 -0.33
Fabricated Metal Products 303.0 -0.35 -0.38 -0.01 -0.04 -0.38 -0.40 -0.01 -0.03
Transportation Equipment 765.8 -0.23 -0.19 -0.05 -0.01 -0.28 -0.19 -0.06 0.03
Electronic equipment 560.9 -0.36 -0.31 -0.09 -0.05 -0.48 -0.36 -0.15 -0.03
Machinery 862.5 -0.29 -0.39 0.00 -0.10 -0.42 -0.41 -0.08 -0.07
Other Manufacturing 116.1 -0.07 0.14 -0.06 0.15 -0.22 0.18 -0.12 0.27
Agriculture 245.5 -0.32 -0.12 -0.16 0.04 -0.28 -0.12 -0.13 0.04
Coal 38.9 -12.61 -18.39 4.94 -0.84 -15.88 -17.66 1.12 -0.66
Oil mining 202.5 -0.61 -5.01 0.01 -4.39 -0.85 -3.83 0.00 -2.97
Gas mining 36.3 -1.36 -7.52 1.55 -4.62 -2.35 -6.24 1.87 -2.03
Other Minerals 32.0 -0.53 -0.66 0.02 -0.10 -0.32 -0.38 -0.04 -0.10
Electric Utilities 300.6 -0.18 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.00
Gas manuf. and distribution 86.4 -4.87 -4.91 0.05 0.00 -4.76 -4.80 0.03 0.00
Construction 1,389.9 -0.45 -0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.45 -0.45 0.00 0.00
Trade 2,419.5 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Transportation Services 788.7 -1.63 -0.83 -0.50 0.30 -1.37 -0.76 -0.40 0.21
Communications 436.8 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.01
Finance and Insurance 1,728.3 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.01
Services (inc real estate) 6,567.1 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.02 0.01
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Table 15. Industry Emission Leakage Due to a $15/ton CO2 Tax in Annex I Countries, without H.R. 2454 Allocations 
          in U.S. (Long Run)
Due to higher 
exports to US






Food, Beverages, and Tobacco -7,457 6 11 5 22 0.3
Textiles -623 8 6 12 26 4.1
Wearing Apparel and Leather  -317 4 0 26 30 9.6
Wood -889 -7 0 -9 -16 -1.8
Paper and Publishing -7,933 16 28 35 79 1.0
Petroleum and Coal Products -18,447 443 378 701 1,522 8.2
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics -14,947 570 658 2,726 3,955 26.5
Non-Metallic Mineral Products -10,110 199 79 683 961 9.5
Ferrous Metals -4,616 213 78 399 691 15.0
Nonferrous primary metals -1,821 116 60 68 245 13.4
Fabricated Metal Products -1,010 2 2 9 12 1.2
Transportation Equipment -1,434 -2 3 6 7 0.5
Electronic equipment -572 -7 3 79 76 13.2
Machinery -1,496 -10 -6 18 3 0.2
Other Manufacturing -183 7 1 305 312 170.2
Agriculture -3,229 7 17 -5 19
Coal -510 -6 -9 -92 -107
Oil mining -2,088 -2,139 -2 828 -1,314
Gas mining -428 -101 -125 -613 -839
Other Minerals -11 0 0 9 9
Electric Utilities -411,572 632 403 227 1,263
Gas manuf. and distribution -6,542 0 1 10 10
Construction -881 0 0 0 0
Trade -5,443 -2 0 -2 -4
Transportation Services -67,547 2,244 1,537 296 4,077
Communications -116 0 0 2 2
Finance and Insurance -827 0 0 -2 -3
Services (inc real estate) -14,895 -3 3 19 19




Change in non-Annex I emissions due to change in 
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Table 16. Industry Emission Leakage Due to $15/ton CO2 Tax in Annex I Countries, with and without 
          H.R. 2454 Allocations in U.S. (Long Run)
Subsidy 
rates
Change in U.S. 
emissions (1000 
tons) Leakage  
Change in U.S. 
emissions (1000 
tons) Leakage  
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.002% -7,457 0.3% -6,212 0.6%
Textiles 0.006% -623 4.1% -426 6.4%
Wearing Apparel and Leather  0.000% -317 9.6% -231 16.1%
Wood 0.011% -889 -1.8% -658 -1.1%
Paper and Publishing 0.167% -7,933 1.0% -6,767 0.5%
Petroleum and Coal Products 0.422% -18,447 8.2% -7,422 18.2%
Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastics 0.248% -14,947 26.5% -11,021 27.4%
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.504% -10,110 9.5% -8,678 5.9%
Ferrous Metals 0.912% -4,616 15.0% -3,394 -1.1%
Nonferrous primary metals 0.228% -1,821 13.4% -1,116 7.9%
Fabricated Metal Products 0.000% -1,010 1.2% -676 0.6%
Transportation Equipment 0.000% -1,434 0.5% -987 1.4%
Electronic equipment 0.000% -572 13.2% -395 22.3%
Machinery 0.000% -1,496 0.2% -1,041 5.7%
Other Manufacturing 0.000% -183 170.2% -174 188.9%
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World -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07
US -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
Carbon Emissions
World 25,994 -2.12 -1.73 -4.81 -4.40
US 6,070 -11.49 -9.47 -10.92 -8.88
Canada 566 1.81 1.31 -10.76 -11.10
Mexico 407 0.45 0.36 0.97 0.87
China 4,414 0.48 0.40 1.49 1.42
India 1,059 0.87 0.77 2.97 2.88
Rest of Annex I 7,669 0.70 0.62 -10.19 -10.25
Oil Exporters 1,994 0.77 0.65 2.41 2.28
Rest of the World 3,814 0.91 0.78 2.78 2.65
Carbon Leakage Rate (%) 20.97 21.72 16.96 17.53
Decomposition of U.S. emissions change
Industry - Input substitution 68.4% 80.8% 69.3% 82.9%
Industry - Output level 20.0% 7.3% 19.2% 5.3%
Household 11.6% 11.9% 11.4% 11.8%
Decompostion of non-policy countries' emissions change
Industry - Input substitution 58.2% 62.9% 82.2% 80.4%
Industry - Output level 32.4% 27.0% -0.3% 1.8%
Household 9.5% 10.1% 18.1% 17.8%
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1 Farms 220 214 211
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 40 49 59
3 Oil Mining 90 75 299
4 Gas Mining 123 102 123
5 Coal Mining 26 26 26
6 Other Mining Activities 158 160 157
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 372 359 361
8 Gas Utilities 115 130 130
9 Construction 1,245 1,330 1,330
10 Food 581 587 618
11 Textile 57 51 69
12 Apparel 29 28 167
13 Wood & Furniture 159 157 208
14 Pulp Mills 4 6 6
15 Paper Mills 51 52 60
16 Paperboard Mills 23 22 22
17 Other Papers 179 150 151
18 Refining-LPG 27 27 27
19 Refining-Other 452 458 498
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 53 64 63
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 26 29 27
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 75 78 67
23 Plastics and Material Resins 76 76 68
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 9 14 13
25 Fertilizers 11 12 13
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 483 478 593
27 Glass Containers 4 4 5
28 Cement 10 10 12
29 Lime and Gypsum 9 9 9
30 Mineral Wool 6 6 6
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 90 88 103
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 83 105 127
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 23 22 34
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 20 20 20
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 13 12 12
36 Other Primary Metals 46 35 58
37 Fabricated Metals 280 271 298
38 Machinery 290 291 321
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 419 407 616
40 Motor Vehicles 351 348 544
41 Other Transportation Equipment 175 172 122
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 144 141 202
43 Trade 2,433 2,281 2,151
44 Air Transportation 145 149 143
45 Truck Transportation 235 242 219
46 Other Transportation 400 402 362
47 Information 1,014 779 754
48 Finance and Insurance 1,366 1,297 1,274
49 Real Estate and Rental 2,302 2,383 2,297
50 Business Services 2,143 2,480 2,398
51 Other Services 3,014 3,470 3,472
52 Govt exc. Electricity 2,609 2,150 2,150
Source:  Industry output is derived from data obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Commodity output is
               based on 2002 relationship between industry/commodity output as found in the 2002 benchmark IO tables.  
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Table A2. Value of Energy Commodity Inputs for Industries, 2006 (million $)
1 Farms 0 0 7 3,381 600 0 10,846
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 0 3 0 79 8 0 582
3 Oil Mining 0 0 14 257 95 0 587
4 Gas Mining 0 0 20 350 129 0 800
5 Coal Mining 0 109 0 115 46 0 1,217
6 Other Mining Activities 0 701 87 767 347 0 9,504
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 0 29,825 22,865 0 106 0 6,124
8 Gas Utilities 0 53,482 0 85 0 0 132
9 Construction 0 0 0 2,219 390 0 26,638
10 Food 0 159 182 7,601 7,301 0 1,896
11 Textile 0 49 38 2,326 1,137 0 191
12 Apparel 0 3 0 216 83 0 9
13 Wood & Furniture 0 93 21 3,327 952 0 3,086
14 Pulp Mills 0 4 7 162 138 0 171
15 Paper Mills 0 54 148 2,975 1,930 0 563
16 Paperboard Mills 1 41 79 2,029 1,508 0 391
17 Other Papers 0 58 7 2,732 1,851 0 28
18 Refining-LPG 16,947 885 6 209 543 0 0
19 Refining-Other 283,206 14,785 105 3,496 9,069 0 0
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 19 1,416 0 433 847 1,803 6,592
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 35 355 28 2,218 29 32 437
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 75 4,028 73 1,975 938 1,234 5,986
23 Plastics and Material Resins 21 1,572 12 1,758 2,329 12,102 1,855
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 3 179 10 491 61 0 282
25 Fertilizers 0 678 2 352 1,885 0 24
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 0 2,132 86 11,681 6,900 1,356 4,368
27 Glass Containers 0 26 0 352 503 0 8
28 Cement 0 9 260 1,109 204 0 954
29 Lime and Gypsum 0 37 89 298 827 0 319
30 Mineral Wool 0 14 3 379 364 0 0
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 0 107 8 1,839 2,842 0 759
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 0 66 525 4,733 3,892 0 245
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 0 132 0 4,111 1,095 0 342
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 0 5 24 1,145 385 0 295
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 0 0 0 422 450 0 0
36 Other Primary Metals 0 0 15 1,731 781 0 650
37 Fabricated Metals 0 86 0 3,868 2,508 0 94
38 Machinery 0 41 1 3,002 853 0 60
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 0 40 0 3,733 889 0 283
40 Motor Vehicles 0 125 4 3,767 1,710 0 224
41 Other Transportation Equipment 0 61 2 1,508 658 0 90
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0 10 0 893 154 0 82
43 Trade 0 1 3 16,208 1,276 0 16,601
44 Air Transportation 0 0 0 131 6 0 29,418
45 Truck Transportation 0 0 0 1,590 278 0 23,024
46 Other Transportation 0 4,072 3 365 105 0 19,931
47 Information 0 0 0 3,312 1,168 0 2,109
48 Finance and Insurance 0 0 0 3,584 371 0 1,098
49 Real Estate and Rental 0 0 6 41,491 1,878 0 6,302
50 Business Services 0 0 5 12,160 1,777 0 16,531
51 Other Services 0 1,491 2 25,177 3,799 0 10,914
52 Govt exc. Electricity 0 7,961 26 20,149 14,056 0 84,347
C 0 0 1 137,180 36,589 10,536 198,520
I -809 -2,438 950 0 0 0 2,594
G 0 89 0 15,201 11,282 0 0
X 302 4,115 1,106 2,240 63 0 29,399
M -225,173 -24,909 -807 -3,940 0 0 -69,505
Total Commodity Output 74,627 101,748 26,020 358,968 129,980 27,063 457,994
Total Domestic Consumption 299,498 122,542 25,722 360,668 129,917 27,063 498,100
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Table A3. Fuel Inputs from the Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (2006)
9 Food 8,130 49 4,613 3,217 660 1,107 82.4
10 Textile 1,704 0 636 95 108 415 25.2
11 Apparel 0 0 40 47 8 69 2.3
12 Wood & Furniture 801 124 636 3,974 101 1,384 36.0
13 Pulp Mills 292 0 1,750 757 13 0 1.8
14 Paper Mills 6,621 0 7,794 473 177 415 32.2
15 Paperboard Mills 3,554 0 4,613 1,135 138 0 22.0
16 Other Papers 292 0 318 95 171 1,246 29.6
17 Refining 4,966 49 9,225 6,244 825 8,027 40.2
18 Petrochemical Manufacturing 0 0 795 189 107 68,641 4.7
19 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 1,120 146 1,432 189 62 2,214 24.0
20 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 3,262 0 318 378 369 85,510 21.4
21 Plastics and Material Resins 536 0 0 189 334 299,474 19.1
22 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 467 0 509 0 42 0 5.3
23 Fertilizers 97 0 0 189 303 0 3.8
24 Other Chemical & Plastics 3,865 0 12,216 946 602 76,313 126.6
25 Glass Containers 0 0 0 63 49 92 3.8
26 Cement 11,441 243 159 568 19 0 12.0
27 Lime and Gypsum 3,797 195 159 378 79 277 3.2
28 Mineral Wool 0 146 0 0 34 0 4.1
29 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 341 0 159 4,667 266 1,015 19.9
30 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 12,366 11,197 3,022 568 348 0 51.3
31 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 0 0 0 189 121 277 44.5
32 Ferrous Metal Foundries 0 1,065 0 552 34 0 12.4
33 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 0 0 0 0 39 0 4.6
34 Other Primary Metals 353 304 0 237 67 346 18.8
35 Fabricated Metals 0 9 0 378 233 1,384 41.9
36 Machinery 49 0 159 378 82 830 32.5
37 Computer & Electrical Equipment 0 0 0 189 85 277 40.4
38 Motor Vehicles 174 0 795 405 173 988 40.8
39 Other Transportation Equipment 70 0 318 162 69 396 16.3
40 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0 0 40 0 24 277 9.7
Total Manufacturing Use 64,296 13,528 49,706 26,853 5,742 550,973 832.9
Note:  These values are for the combusted fuels, not all purpose or consumed fuels.
Source:  Based on data from the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey.  
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Combusted Total consumption Combusted
1 Farms 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 Oil Mining 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0
4 Gas Mining 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0
5 Coal Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 Other Mining Activities 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.0
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 1,026.6 1,026.6 0.0 0.0
8 Gas Utilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9 Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 Food 8.2 8.2 0.0 0.0
11 Textile 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0
12 Apparel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
13 Wood & Furniture 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0
14 Pulp Mills 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
15 Paper Mills 6.6 6.6 0.0 0.0
16 Paperboard Mills 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.0
17 Other Papers 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
18 Refining-LPG 0.3 0.1 419.7 26.5
19 Refining-Other 4.7 2.5 7,014.2 442.9
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 3.3 2.6 1.9 1.9
23 Plastics and Material Resins 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1
25 Fertilizers 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 3.9 3.8 0.0 0.0
27 Glass Containers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
28 Cement 11.7 11.7 0.0 0.0
29 Lime and Gypsum 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.0
30 Mineral Wool 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 23.6 22.7 0.0 0.0
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
36 Other Primary Metals 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0
37 Fabricated Metals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
38 Machinery 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
40 Motor Vehicles 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
41 Other Transportation Equipment 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
43 Trade 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
44 Air Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
45 Truck Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
46 Other Transportation 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
47 Information 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
48 Finance and Insurance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
49 Real Estate and Rental 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
50 Business Services 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
51 Other Services 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
52 Govt exc. Electricity 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0
Source:  Based on the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey and authors' calculations.  
Coal and coke (million short tons) Crude oil (million bbl)
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1 Farms 0.0 0.0 159.2 126.4
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 0.0 0.0 8.5 6.8
3 Oil Mining 0.0 0.0 8.6 6.8
4 Gas Mining 0.0 0.0 11.7 9.3
5 Coal Mining 0.0 0.0 17.9 14.2
6 Other Mining Activities 0.0 0.0 139.5 110.8
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 0.0 0.0 89.9 71.4
8 Gas Utilities 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.5
9 Construction 0.0 0.0 391.0 310.5
10 Food 0.0 0.0 27.8 27.7
11 Textile 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.8
12 Apparel 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
13 Wood & Furniture 0.0 0.0 45.3 44.2
14 Pulp Mills 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5
15 Paper Mills 0.0 0.0 8.3 8.3
16 Paperboard Mills 0.0 0.0 5.7 5.7
17 Other Papers 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
18 Refining-LPG 20.4 20.4 0.0 0.0
19 Refining-Other 341.4 341.4 0.0 0.0
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 70.6 0.0 96.8 96.5
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 2.3 0.0 6.4 5.2
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 89.5 0.0 87.9 71.0
23 Plastics and Material Resins 300.9 1.7 27.2 22.9
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 0.0 0.0 4.1 3.1
25 Fertilizers 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 79.5 1.7 64.1 15.1
27 Glass Containers 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
28 Cement 0.0 0.0 14.0 14.0
29 Lime and Gypsum 0.0 0.0 4.7 4.7
30 Mineral Wool 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 0.0 0.0 11.1 9.0
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 0.0 0.0 3.6 3.6
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.5
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.0 0.0 4.3 3.8
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
36 Other Primary Metals 0.0 0.0 9.5 1.6
37 Fabricated Metals 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.3
38 Machinery 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.5
40 Motor Vehicles 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.2
41 Other Transportation Equipment 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2
43 Trade 0.0 0.0 243.7 193.5
44 Air Transportation 0.0 0.0 431.9 342.9
45 Truck Transportation 0.0 0.0 338.0 268.4
46 Other Transportation 0.0 0.0 292.6 232.3
47 Information 0.0 0.0 31.0 24.6
48 Finance and Insurance 0.0 0.0 16.1 12.8
49 Real Estate and Rental 0.0 0.0 92.5 73.5
50 Business Services 0.0 0.0 242.7 192.7
51 Other Services 0.0 0.0 160.2 127.2
52 Govt exc. Electricity 0.0 0.0 1,019.6 809.6
Source:  Based on the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey and authors' calculations.  
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1 Farms 51.5 51.5 37
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 1.4 1.4 1
3 Oil Mining 8.1 8.1 3
4 Gas Mining 11.1 11.1 4
5 Coal Mining 26.6 26.6 1
6 Other Mining Activities 175.9 175.9 8
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 6,231.2 6,231.2 0
8 Gas Utilities 11,157.2 0.0 1
9 Construction 33.4 33.4 24
10 Food 659.9 659.6 82
11 Textile 107.9 107.9 25
12 Apparel 7.8 7.8 2
13 Wood & Furniture 101.1 100.8 36
14 Pulp Mills 12.6 12.6 2
15 Paper Mills 176.9 176.9 32
16 Paperboard Mills 138.0 138.0 22
17 Other Papers 171.0 170.7 30
18 Refining-LPG 46.6 46.6 2
19 Refining-Other 778.5 778.5 38
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 106.9 106.9 5
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 62.2 54.4 24
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 369.3 297.4 21
23 Plastics and Material Resins 334.3 323.6 19
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 42.5 35.2 5
25 Fertilizers 303.2 302.9 4
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 601.8 538.1 127
27 Glass Containers 48.6 48.6 4
28 Cement 19.4 19.4 12
29 Lime and Gypsum 78.7 78.7 3
30 Mineral Wool 34.0 34.0 4
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 266.3 266.3 20
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 347.9 316.8 51
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 121.5 121.5 45
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 34.0 34.0 12
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 38.6 38.6 5
36 Other Primary Metals 67.1 67.1 19
37 Fabricated Metals 233.2 233.0 42
38 Machinery 81.6 81.6 33
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 84.5 84.3 40
40 Motor Vehicles 172.8 172.8 41
41 Other Transportation Equipment 69.2 69.2 16
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 15.2 15.2 10
43 Trade 109.6 109.6 176
44 Air Transportation 0.5 0.5 1
45 Truck Transportation 23.8 23.8 17
46 Other Transportation 858.5 858.5 4
47 Information 100.3 100.3 36
48 Finance and Insurance 31.8 31.8 39
49 Real Estate and Rental 161.2 161.2 450
50 Business Services 152.5 152.5 132
51 Other Services 637.3 637.3 273
52 Govt exc. Electricity 2,867.4 2,867.4 218
Source:  Based on the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey and authors' calculations.  
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1 Farms 77.65 53.60 24.05
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 3.19 2.77 0.42
3 Oil Mining 6.43 4.41 2.01
4 Gas Mining 8.76 6.02 2.74
5 Coal Mining 8.18 7.09 1.09
6 Other Mining Activities 66.78 61.19 5.59
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 2,362.71 2,362.71 0.00
8 Gas Utilities 1.18 0.61 0.57
9 Construction 139.43 125.08 14.34
10 Food 115.53 62.95 52.58
11 Textile 25.37 10.32 15.05
12 Apparel 1.72 0.48 1.24
13 Wood & Furniture 46.74 24.85 21.89
14 Pulp Mills 3.35 2.25 1.09
15 Paper Mills 44.92 25.81 19.10
16 Paperboard Mills 29.65 16.73 12.91
17 Other Papers 28.76 10.05 18.72
18 Refining-LPG 20.63 19.20 1.43
19 Refining-Other 344.76 320.88 23.88
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 47.48 44.37 3.11
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 22.38 7.57 14.81
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 64.69 50.34 14.35
23 Plastics and Material Resins 41.57 28.45 13.12
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 7.12 4.08 3.04
25 Fertilizers 19.27 16.85 2.41
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 122.51 43.19 79.32
27 Glass Containers 4.94 2.71 2.24
28 Cement 37.10 29.31 7.79
29 Lime and Gypsum 16.10 13.91 2.18
30 Mineral Wool 4.98 2.14 2.83
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 31.27 18.80 12.47
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 101.70 62.89 38.81
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 39.02 6.85 32.17
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 14.37 5.45 8.93
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 5.44 2.11 3.33
36 Other Primary Metals 17.59 5.05 12.54
37 Fabricated Metals 40.39 13.28 27.12
38 Machinery 26.25 4.91 21.34
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 27.00 4.80 22.20
40 Motor Vehicles 42.55 11.05 31.50
41 Other Transportation Equipment 14.40 4.42 9.97
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 6.91 1.31 5.60
43 Trade 186.00 83.08 102.92
44 Air Transportation 136.93 136.14 0.78
45 Truck Transportation 119.06 107.84 11.22
46 Other Transportation 141.72 139.44 2.28
47 Information 34.90 15.24 19.65
48 Finance and Insurance 28.79 6.83 21.95
49 Real Estate and Rental 288.90 38.51 250.39
50 Business Services 161.72 85.30 76.42
51 Other Services 248.05 85.50 162.55
52 Govt exc. Electricity 613.09 480.47 132.62
Government 154.05 53.99 100.05
Consumption 2,052.75 1,149.83 902.91
Total 8,256.68 5,883.03 2,373.66
Source:  Based on the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey and authors' calculations.  Resources for the Future  Adkins et al. 
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Table A8.  Primary CO2 Emissions Intensity and Total including Electricity (Metric Tons/million $)
Total CO2 intensity  Primary CO2 intensity
1 Farms 344.6 243.5
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc 82.7 69.6
3 Oil Mining 67.9 49.1
4 Gas Mining 67.9 49.1
5 Coal Mining 300.2 271.2
6 Other Mining Activities 418.0 386.1
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) 6,346.4 6,346.4
8 Gas Utilities 240.7 5.3
9 Construction 112.2 100.5
10 Food 194.5 108.4
11 Textile 449.2 180.9
12 Apparel 65.1 16.3
13 Wood & Furniture 293.2 155.8
14 Pulp Mills 801.0 543.4
15 Paper Mills 883.9 502.6
16 Paperboard Mills 1,296.4 721.0
17 Other Papers 156.3 56.0
18 Refining-LPG 760.4 709.5
19 Refining-Other 760.8 709.9
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing 897.6 843.4
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg 863.4 294.9
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg 847.8 673.8
23 Plastics and Material Resins 523.3 372.0
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments 858.6 479.3
25 Fertilizers 1,733.2 1,523.9
26 Other Chemical & Plastics 248.5 89.4
27 Glass Containers 1,141.9 615.4
28 Cement 8,083.3 2,843.9
29 Lime and Gypsum 3,617.9 1,555.0
30 Mineral Wool 721.1 333.5
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral 345.2 210.0
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy 1,128.5 754.6
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum 1,479.6 298.9
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries 647.5 271.7
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries 390.5 168.6
36 Other Primary Metals 354.9 109.0
37 Fabricated Metals 138.3 47.4
38 Machinery 84.9 16.9
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment 70.2 11.5
40 Motor Vehicles 102.2 31.5
41 Other Transportation Equipment 81.9 25.2
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 49.7 9.0
43 Trade 78.0 34.2
44 Air Transportation 947.5 941.5
45 Truck Transportation 503.8 459.2
46 Other Transportation 354.9 348.9
47 Information 36.5 15.0
48 Finance and Insurance 22.3 5.0
49 Real Estate and Rental 135.4 16.7
50 Business Services 77.2 39.8
51 Other Services 83.3 28.4
52 Govt exc. Electricity 235.0 184.2
Source:  Based on the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey, BEA industry output data
and authors' calculations.  Resources for the Future  Adkins et al. 
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Table B1.  Output Demand Elasticities
Sectors Annex 1 policy Unilateral policy
1 Farms -0.369 -0.765
2 Forestry, Fishing, etc -0.369 -0.765
3 Oil Mining -0.170 -0.111
4 Gas Mining -0.301 -0.171
5 Coal Mining -0.426 -0.161
6 Other Mining Activities -0.147 -0.348
7 Electric Utilities (inc govt enterprises) -0.505 -0.518
8 Gas Utilities -0.530 -0.530
9 Construction -0.712 -0.715
10 Food -0.349 -0.588
11 Textile -1.082 -1.775
12 Apparel -1.700 -2.288
13 Wood & Furniture -0.729 -1.124
14 Pulp Mills -0.294 -0.585
15 Paper Mills -0.294 -0.585
16 Paperboard Mills -0.294 -0.585
17 Other Papers -0.294 -0.585
18 Refining-LPG -0.071 -0.071
19 Refining-Other -0.071 -0.071
20 Petrochemical Manufacturing -0.462 -1.424
21 Basic Inorganic Chemical Mfg -0.462 -1.424
22 Other Basic Organic Chemical Mfg -0.462 -1.424
23 Plastics and Material Resins -0.462 -1.424
24 Artificial & Synthetic Fibers and Filaments -0.462 -1.424
25 Fertilizers -0.462 -1.424
26 Other Chemical & Plastics -0.462 -1.424
27 Glass Containers -0.362 -0.767
28 Cement -0.362 -0.767
29 Lime and Gypsum -0.362 -0.767
30 Mineral Wool -0.362 -0.767
31 Other Nonmetallic Mineral -0.362 -0.767
32 Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy -0.288 -0.912
33 Alumina Refining, Primary & Secondary Aluminum -0.733 -1.901
34 Ferrous Metal Foundries -0.288 -0.912
35 Non-Ferrous Metal Foundries -0.733 -1.901
36 Other Primary Metals -0.733 -1.901
37 Fabricated Metals -0.385 -0.717
38 Machinery -0.873 -1.814
39 Computer & Electrical Equipment -1.484 -2.733
40 Motor Vehicles -0.737 -1.828
41 Other Transportation Equipment -0.737 -1.828
42 Miscellaneous Manufacturing -1.539 -2.636
43 Trade -0.422 -0.438
44 Air Transportation -0.347 -0.550
45 Truck Transportation -0.347 -0.550
46 Other Transportation -0.347 -0.550
47 Information -0.364 -0.421
48 Finance and Insurance -0.370 -0.438
49 Real Estate and Rental -0.602 -0.672
50 Business Services -0.602 -0.672
51 Other Services -0.602 -0.672
52 Govt exc. Electricity -0.602 -0.672 Resources for the Future  Adkins et al. 
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  Table B2 - Overview of Corrections for Double-Counting in Energy Data for Iron and Steel Mills
  Iron and Steel Mills - MECS Data - trillion BTU (2006)











All-Purpose Use of Energy 1,019 175 19 3 337 * 360 230 39 145
Feedstock Use of Energy 431 - 0 * 32 * 345 44 9
Non-Feedstock Use of Energy 1,125 175 19 3 305 * 14 344 265
Step 1:  Assumption that feedstock use of Coal is converted to Coke
All-Purpose Use of Energy 1,019 175 19 3 337 * 360 230 39
Feedstock Use of Energy 431 - 0 * 32 * x 44 9
Non-Feedstock Use of Energy 1,125 175 19 3 305 * 14 344 265
Step 2:  Combine 'Other' category with Coal consumption
All-Purpose Use of Energy 1,019 175 19 3 337 * 254 230 0
Feedstock Use of Energy 431 - 0 * 32 * 9 44 0
Non-Feedstock Use of Energy 1,125 175 19 3 305 * 14 344 0
Step 3:  Non-feedstock use of Coal calculated as residual of all-purpose and feedstock use of energy
All-Purpose Use of Energy 1,019 175 19 3 337 * 254 230 0
Feedstock Use of Energy 431 - 0 * 32 * 9 44 0
Non-Feedstock Use of Energy 1,125 175 19 3 305 * 245 344 0
Step 4:  Consumption labeled as * is replaced with 0s
All-Purpose Use of Energy 1,019 175 19 3 337 0 254 230 0
Feedstock Use of Energy 431 0 0 0 32 0 9 44 0
Non-Feedstock Use of Energy 1,125 175 19 3 305 0 245 344 0
Step 5:  Removal of over-counting in non-feedstock component of Coke and Breeze consumption
All-Purpose Use of Energy 1,019 175 19 3 337 0 254 230 0
Feedstock Use of Energy 431 0 0 0 32 0 9 44 0
Non-Feedstock Use of Energy 1,125 175 19 3 305 0 245 186 0
 
 